“Poland is now simply consumed by Russophobia. They hate us—just hate us like mad. Everyone. Everyone is a victim. They’ve been brainwashed, bewitched. They are ready to spend their entire lives hating Russians. Sooner or later it will pass, like a common cold—but unfortunately, this is the situation we face today.”
These absurd and demonstrably false words were spoken with complete seriousness to a Russian youth audience by Dmitry Peskov, press secretary to the President of the Russian Federation, on 24 April 2023. He made the remarks during a major educational event in Russia: the Federal Educational Marathon – Knowledge.The initiative was held for the fifth time across five Russian cities: Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Arkhangelsk, Pyatigorsk, and Luhansk. In Moscow, speakers included Dmitry Peskov himself, Sergei Kiriyenko (First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration), Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, and numerous other political and cultural figures. Over three days, the event reportedly attracted more than 18,000 participants, who not only attended lectures but also met directly with representatives of Russia’s ruling elite. The speakers unanimously claimed that a hybrid war had been unleashed against Russia—one that demands sacrifice from the Russian people and faith in Russia’s inherent potential. They argued that knowledge is now becoming an antidote to the lies and falsifications allegedly spread by the West during Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Russophobia: A Russian Myth
In Russian media and political discourse, references to alleged “Russophobia”as a form of irrational hostility appear frequently. It is a favourite term of figures such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Russian politicians reach for the term whenever they encounter criticism of the Russian government’s actions. According to this logic, criticism of Kremlin policies is inherently irrational and must therefore stem from prejudice against the Russian nation. Russian state propaganda often portrays Russia as the victim of international conspiracies, leading foreign criticism to be framed as prejudice—or even outright Russophobia. In reality, Russophobia refers to prejudice, hostility, or fear directed at Russians or Russian culture.
This phenomenon can have various causes—historical, political, and cultural—and often arises in response to Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, especially in regions that have suffered from Russian expansion, invasion, or interference, such as Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic states. Alleged “Russophobia” is presented as hostility toward Russians as a people. This framing reinforces a sense of isolation, depicting the outside world as inherently hostile—a worldview that has been cultivated for centuries. At times, it seems that many Russians have come to believe that their neighbours simply dislike them.
In this narrative, Russophobia is portrayed almost as an innate condition —a kind of disorder, an expression of social aggression against Russia transmitted through some imagined biological mechanism. It is said to produce irrational prejudice. As a result, the term “Russophobia” functions in Russia’s political and media narrative as a political tool: a way to distort reality and suppress all criticism of Russia. In practice, accusations of Russophobia serve to score political points both domestically and internationally. Russia presents itself as a victim of unjust criticism, while any actions taken by countries opposing Russian interests are attributed to a supposedly “persecutory” attitude toward Russia.
Polish “Disease”
Poland is portrayed as a place where this supposed “disease” is particularly widespread. Accusations of Russophobia in Poland are complex, blending myth with reality. The Kremlin uses these claims to discredit Polish criticism of Russian actions, especially when it comes to foreign policy. Some in Europe have already accepted this anti-Polish narrative, believing that Poles are incapable of objectively assessing Russia—that they are driven by prejudice and lack a rational approach toward their eastern neighbour. This was evident, for example, when Poland opposed Russian and German cooperation on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines. Polish criticism of Germany’s energy policy—based on uncritical cooperation with Russia—was dismissed as “Russophobic,” a tactic aimed at neutralising Poland’s arguments. To this day, the Kremlin systematically uses the term to delegitimise Polish foreign policy, portraying Poland as driven by irrational hatred of Russia.
Polish society generally views Russia with considerable scepticism. Public opinion polls show that Poles often perceive Russia as a threat, primarily because of its domestic and foreign policies. Importantly, these
attitudes do not stem from prejudice against Russians as a nation, but from an assessment of the Russian government’s actions. There is also genuine interest in Russian culture, literature, and art in Poland— evidence that Polish “Russophobia” is political rather than social or cultural.
Poland’s policy toward Russia is not rooted in irrational hostility, as the Kremlin often suggests, but in a realistic assessment of geopolitical risks. As a member of NATO and the European Union, Poland seeks to protect its sovereignty and security, as well as that of Central and Eastern Europe. Key elements of this policy include strengthening NATO’s eastern flank, promoting a NATO military presence on Polish territory to deter potential Russian aggression, as well as providing political and economic support to Ukraine. recognising that a sovereign, democratic Ukraine is crucial for regional stability. Poland has also diversified its energy sector, reducing dependence on Russian resources through alternative energy sources and cooperation with other nations in the region.
Dislike Has Rational Causes
Despite Russian propaganda accusing Poland of Russophobia, there are numerous rational reasons why Polish society and political elites are sceptical of Russia. Many are historical, while others stem from contemporary Russian actions. This scepticism is not irrational—quite the opposite. It reflects a fundamentally realistic approach.
Historical Memory
Poland’s experiences with Russia and the Soviet Union have played a key role in shaping its attitudes towards Moscow. For centuries, Poland was within Russia’s sphere of influence, leading to repeated conflicts. Russia played a key role in the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795, erasing Poland from the map of Europe for more than 120 years. This was followed by multiple national uprisings against Russian rule in the 19th century.
Further trauma came with the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 under the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, followed by occupation of Poland’s eastern territories, mass repression, and crimes symbolised by the Katyn massacre. The period of the Polish People’s Republic further cemented these fears, as Poland existed as a Soviet satellite state
deprived of political sovereignty. These historical events left deep scars in Poland’s collective memory, fostering a lasting distrust of Russia.
Russian Foreign Policy
Russian actions—the wars in Chechnya, Georgia (2008), the annexation of Crimea (2014), support for separatists in Donbas, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have been condemned in Poland. They naturally reinforce negative attitudes, towards Russia, which is not irrational but grounded in common sense. Poles are particularly concerned about war crimes and Russia’s violation of human rights. All of this deepens negative attitudes towards Russia, not only in Poland.
Poland’s Role in Europe
After the USSR’s collapse, Poland became a leading advocate of integration with NATO and the EU, while Russia views these institutions as threats to its sphere of influence. Key events shaping Poland’s contemporary attitude towards Russia include the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, which Poland unequivocally condemned as a threat not only to its neighbour but also to the stability of Europe as a whole. Poles also feared potential Russian energy isolation, assuming that Nord Stream 2, connecting Russia with Germany, would increase Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, which could be exploited as a tool for political pressure. What is more, Poles are understandably concerned about Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics, which aim to spread disinformation and destabilise Europe. Russia’s interference in domestic politics and its efforts to destabilise other countries, such as through cyberattacks, are seen as a direct threat in Poland.
An Anti-Polish Myth
Accusations of Russophobia against Poland are largely a myth promoted by Russian authorities to discredit Polish concerns and actions related to Russia’s policy. In reality, Poland’s scepticism toward Russia is rooted in historical experience and current geopolitical threats. Poland’s policy toward Russia is driven by the pursuit of security, sovereignty, and regional stability—not by irrational hatred or hostility toward Russia or Russians as such.
Marek Melnyk
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