Aleksandr Dugin: The Ideologue Behind Anti-Polish Disinformation

Russian propagandists do more than just develop and spread Kremlin’s directives. They draw inspiration from the ideologues of Russian imperialism. The disinformation in Russian media goes beyond clever lies or factual manipulation. These are only tools of a broader disinformation strategy. To truly grasp Russian disinformation, one must understand its ideological foundation and its dependence on Russian thinkers, writers, and philosophers who glorify Russian imperialism.

Aleksandr Dugin

One of the key intellectual architects behind contemporary Russian imperialism is Aleksandr Dugin (born 1962). A Russian philosopher, sociologist, and ideologue, Dugin’s geopolitical and theological-political concepts have significantly influenced the thinking of Russian elites, and to some extent, the Kremlin’s strategy after 2014 and 2022. Poland occupies a unique position in Dugin’s vision of Eurasia – it is regarded not only as an ally of the West but as a structural adversary of the Eurasian Empire. Dugin is currently widely regarded as the most influential Russian ideologue of the 21st century, the leading proponent of neo-Eurasianism, and the intellectual patron of Putin’s geopolitics. Interestingly, Dugin is known in Poland and initially attracted some uncritical attention. Although Dugin does not formally hold an official government position, his ideas are echoed by official Russian  media and propagandists, including Sergey Lavrov, Vladimir Solovyov, and Patriarch Kirill. In their narratives, Poland is frequently portrayed as a “war provocateur,” “historical revanchist,” or a “participant in NATO’s plan to destroy Russia.” The rhetorical parallels with Dugin’s demonisation of Poland suggest an ideological exchange between the intellectual circles and the state propaganda.

Dugin and Sacred Geopolitics: The Metaphysical Roots of Russian Imperialism

Dugin is the founder of modern sacred geopolitics. In his view, geopolitics is not simply the science of space and state power but a metaphysical project—a spiritual struggle to restore a traditional order in opposition to liberal modernity. Within this system, Russia plays the key role of the *katechon*—the force that holds back chaos and the Antichrist.

The Katechon as a Geopolitical Subject

In works such as The Fourth Political Theory and Foundations of Geopolitics, Dugin interprets world history through the prism of an eschatological struggle between good and evil. Central to this conflict is Russia’s role as the katechon, a force preventing global chaos, which he associates with liberalism, capitalism, individualism, and Western modernity. Dugin reinterprets the concept of the katechon, derived from the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians (2 Thess. 2:6-7), through the prism of Orthodox political mysticism, identifying it with Russia’s imperial, sacral mission.

Geopolitics as the Theology of History

Dugin’s geopolitics operates within dualistic categories: land vs. sea, tradition vs. modernity, Eurasia vs. Atlantis, sacred vs. profane. Inspired by Carl Schmitt, Friedrich Jünger, and René Guénon, Dugin interprets political space as a battlefield of spiritual forces. Russia-Eurasia represents the continental pole of Tradition, while Anglo-Saxon civilisation—Atlantis—embodies decadence, liberalism, and Luciferian rebellion against the metaphysical order. Thus, geopolitics stops to be a realist tool of international analysis and becomes a theology of history, with political actors serving archetypal and eschatological roles.

The Place of Religion in Dugin’s Political Project

Though not a theologian per se, Dugin’s project is deeply imbued with religious language and symbolism. However, he dismisses Western Christianit, both Catholicism and Protestantism, as corrupted by modernity. In his view, only Orthodox Christianity – specifically in its Russian form – can serve as the spiritual foundation of the Eurasian Empire. In Dugin’s geopolitics, religion serves not so much a soteriological function, but rather a structural one: it constitutes a cosmic order that justifies power, hierarchy and the struggle against other ‘orders’ – liberal, secular or post-Christian.

The Sacralisation of Space

One of the most distinctive elements of Dugin’s sacred geopolitics is the concept of space as sacrum. Borders are not merely lines on a map; they are spiritual frontiers, and crossing them invites chaos. A key category here is that of the “empire” as sacred space, analogous to the sacred space of the Church. Dugin draws upon the Byzantine and Eurasian traditions, in which the empire fulfilled a theological function, serving as an earthly reflection of the celestial order. Dugin’s concept of sacred geopolitics is an effort to create a metapolitical narrative, weaving together politics, religion, geography, and eschatology to form a coherent whole. The aim is not only to understand reality, but to transform it through mystical means. Russia, in this view, is intended to be more than a powerful nation; it is to be a tool in a metaphysical battle to regenerate the world. This scheme is deeply anti-liberal, anti-Western, and imperialistic, and its sacred nature makes it hard for the rational political thinking of the West to grasp.

Poland as the Enemy of Russia

Dugin has long depicted Poland as a primary adversary to the Eurasian project and as a “rampart of the West” that must be neutralised, subjugated, or removed from the political map of influence. Dugin’s views on Poland are overtly aggressive and rooted in his geopolitical worldview. He sees Poland as an existential opponent of Russia due to its NATO and EU membership (structures of the “sea civilisation” – hostile to the “land civilisation,” i.e., Russia), its role as a conduit of American influence in Central and Eastern Europe, and its pursuit of integration with Ukraine and support for its independence, which contradicts Moscow’s plans.

Poland as the “Bulwark of Atlanticism”

In Foundations of Geopolitics (1997), Dugin portrays the world as a battleground between two great forces: the “civilisation of the sea” (Atlantis, the West) and the “civilisation of the land” (Eurasia, Russia). Poland, as a member of NATO and the EU, is described as the main bastion of the West on the eastern flank of Europe: “Poland is the civilisational cordon sanitaire of the West, which must be crossed or destroyed.”

According to this logic, Poland is not entitled to neutrality. Its existence as an independent and pro-Western state disrupts the geopolitical balance and blocks the expansion of Russia’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

“The Treacherous Slav”

Dugin inherits and expands upon 19th-century Russian stereotypes of Poland as a “treacherous” nation that rejected Slavic unity in favour of the West, Catholicism, and individualism. In his interpretation, “Poles betrayed the Slavic community, becoming a tool of Latin civilisation against Eurasia”. According to Dugin, Polish Russophobia does not stem from a genuine threat but from an “ideological disease” that the West fuels to weaken “the heart of Eurasia”— namelyRussia.

Rejection of Polish Catholicism and the Jagiellonian Vision of Civilisation

In The Fourth Political Theory (2009), Dugin firlmly rejects Catholic universalism as an element of decadent liberalism. Within this framework, Catholicism, particularly its Polish variant, embodies an “ideological heresy of the West”: “Catholicism is an encoded form of liberal globalism, which destroys the spiritual identity of nations.”  Dugin also rejects the historical concept of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a utopian and anti-Russian construct, at odds with the Eurasian order. His aversion extends to contemporary Polish geopolitical concepts, such as Intermarium, which he interprets as an attempt to “outflank Russia”.

Poland as a Roadblock to the Eurasian Empire

Dugin has repeatedly stated that Poland cannot exist as an independent political entity within the Eurasian sphere. In one interview, he suggested:“The partition of Poland between Russia, Germany, and the Czech Republic would be a stable solution.” In his vision, the ideal Eurasia stretches “from Lisbon to Vladivostok”—but without the presence of the United States and, significantly, without a sovereign Poland.

Poland as a Participant in the “War of Civilisations” Post-2022

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Dugin’s rhetoric concerning Poland has become even more extreme. He portrays Poland in articles and media appearances as the “primary source of aggressive information”, a “participant in a proxy war against Russia,” and a “front-line state in a civilisational clash of apocalyptic proportions”. Within this narrative, Poland becomes an unavoidable adversary in the next stage of the war, which is characterised as both eschatological and civilisational.

Polish Catholicism as a Tool of the West

Aleksandr Dugin has repeatedly criticised Western civilisation, and within this framework, with a particularly critical assessment of Catholicism, especially its Polish form. In his writings, Polish Catholicism is depicted as an ideologised, spiritually degenerate project, one that serves the geopolitical interests of the West. Dugin sees Polish Catholicism as an element of a broad ideological conflict between Orthodox-Eurasian Russia and Latin-personalist West. In his thinking, Catholicism as such, and especially its Polish form, is seen as a form of spiritual heresy and betrayal of true Tradition. In his main work, “The Fourth Political Theory,” Dugin states that the West has abandoned the sacred in favour of rationalism, individualism, and nihilism, which are also expressed in Catholic anthropology and social ethics. Polish Catholicism is no exception here: it appears as an ideological pillar of Western liberalism and anti-Russian sentiment, which, instead of striving for the unity of the Slavs, promotes their spiritual disintegration. If Dugin finds anything of interest in Polish culture, it is only in those figures he identifies as opposed to Catholicism: “(…) Polish Freemasonry and occultists, Jan Potocki and Hoene-Wroński, Menżyński and Dzierżyński. They all chose the Eurasian path (…)”. Dugin’s texts also present the idea that Poland, as the bulwark of Christianity (antemurale christianitatis), used Catholicism as a tool of expansion to the East, which, according to him, led to historical tragedies, such as the Union of Brest or the alleged “Catholic colonisation” of Rus’. Thus, Polish Catholicism ceases to be a religion and becomes a geopolitical weapon aimed at the “katechonic mission of Russia”.

Catholicism as Heresy Against Orthodoxy

Aleksandr Dugin, drawing on Orthodox theology, particularly the concept of sobornost (conciliarity), categorically rejects not only Protestantism but also Catholicism, which he views as a betrayal of Christianity’s spiritual heritage. In his essay “Orthodoxy and Politics,” he argues that the Catholic Church is a schismatic structure that transformed Christianity into a political system based on a logic of domination and a Western understanding of law. Polish Catholicism, as the most institutionalised form of the Catholic sacred in the Slavic sphere, is, according to Dugin, the closest and most dangerous spiritual adversary of Orthodoxy. In this sense, his criticism extends beyond theology to national spirituality. Dugin appears to view Poles as a Slavic nation wronged by the imposition of Latinity and Catholic identity.

Spiritual Confrontation: Eurasian Collectivism vs. Catholic Personalism

Dugin’s critique of Polish Catholicism extends to a criticism of the personalist Christian anthropology so central to the thought of John Paul II. Where Catholic personalism emphasises individual dignity, conscience, and religious freedom, Dugin sees a damaging liberal illusion leading to societal breakdown. He proposes a vision of collective identity: a union of people, Church, and state, united in a metaphysical struggle against chaos. Therefore, Polish Catholicism becomes, for Dugin, not only a competing worldview but a potential source of spiritual rebellion against Russia’s Eurasian project. Dugin frequently uses the biblical concept of the “katechon” – “he who withholds evil” (2 Thessalonians 2:6–7). In his geopolitical theology, Russia fulfils the role of the katechon, defending the world from collapse. Poland, however, “stops the arrival of Good, blocking the Eurasian order. It is an anti-katechon – a spiritual saboteur of salvation.” Therefore, Poland is more than a geopolitical rival; it is a theological obstacle. Dugin’s criticism has theological and political dimensions. While Dugin applies the term katechon (withholder of evil) to Russia, he assigns Poland the opposite role: Poland, he argues, delays the “victory of Good” (i.e., Russia) through its stubborn adherence to Western errors. In this sense, Poland becomes an anti-katechon, a spiritual and political enemy.

John Paul II’s Catholic Personalism

To properly illustrate how dangerous and fundamentally flawed Dugin’s doctrine regarding Poland is, it is necessary to contrast it with John Paul II’s understanding of Russia. The most striking contrast lies in the complete opposition between Dugin’s imperial mysticism and John Paul II’s universal personalism.

Personalism: The Individual as the Path

For John Paul II, the human person, as an image of God, is the path of the Church – not the state, not race, not a spiritual-ethnic community. The true unity of Europe is possible only through reconciliation of East and West, not through the domination of one side. Love and freedom are fundamental theological categories, not authority and struggle.

Polish Catholicism Is Not Imperialistic

From Wojtyła’s perspective, Polishness does not represent a tool for conflict with Russia, but rather a specific historical “place” for the realisation of the Church’s universal mission. Therefore, Polish Catholicism is not a “civilisation against” (as Dugin would claim), but a form of service to humanity and a supranational community.

Condemnation of War

Dugin advocates for the sacralisation of war, viewing it as a spiritual imperative to “defend Tradition” and combat the “antichrist of the West.” In his understanding, Russia is waging a holy war aimed at restoring an eschatological order. Conversely, John Paul II always considered war a defeat for humanity and morality, not a “katechonic mission.” The Pope condemned violence, even when religiously justified, deeming it a betrayal of the Gospel of love. The comparison between of Dugin’s ideology and John Paul II’s personalism reveals a fundamental clash between two visions of humanity, religion, and the world. Dugin proposes a religious-imperial ontology of conflict, grounded in collectivism and state messianism. John Paul II, on there other hand, advocated for a Christianity centred on the individual, reconciliation, and hope, in the spirit of freedom and responsibility.

Conclusions

In Aleksandr Dugin’s ideology, Poland and Polish Catholicism emerge as both spiritual and ideological adversaries of Orthodox Russia. Perceived as a tool of the West, an instrument of historical expansion, and a product of rationalist heresy, Polish Catholicism becomes a spiritual opponent of the Eurasian project. This analysis highlights profound tensions, not only between two Christian traditions, but more significantly, between two concepts of the sacred: a collective, imperial, and “katechonic” order on one hand, and a personalist, libertarian, and universalist one on the other. Contrary to Dugin’s accusations, Polish Catholicism is not a form of “anti-Russianism,” but rather a part of the broader heritage of personalist civilisation, which rejects violence as a form of the sacred. In Dugin’s thinking, Poland is not merely a neighbour or a political opponent. It is a civilisational enemy that embodies everything Russia is compelled to overcome: Catholicism, Atlanticism, liberalism, universalism, and the concept of a pluralistic community of nations. Dugin is constructing a modern mythology of threat around Poland, which is reflected in Russian state discourse. Its aim is to justify hostility – not only towards Poland, but towards the liberal-democratic order in Europe itself.

Marek Melnyk