The date of 4 November, celebrated as a day of Russian national unity, coincidentally marks the expulsion of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth forces from Moscow in 1612. This historical event is often portrayed by Moscow as Russia’s liberation from “Polish occupation!” This historical perspective is echoed in a viral video where a Russian individual makes a following claim:

“October 4, 2024. Hero city. Moscow. The day of liberation of the motherland from Polish occupiers. Now it’s our turn. Today we will free ourselves from American fascists. And we will do it using our strategic missiles aimed at U.S. territory.”

This assertion is not a translation error! It connects the past to the present. The Poles have been replaced by new adversaries—Americans, now also branded as fascists! Why do Russians revisit these historical events to solemnly celebrate their unity? What drives them to look back four centuries to reinforce national unity? Why do they commemorate the expulsion of Polish forces from the Kremlin while celebrating their unity? It seems evident that Russians feel the need to anchor their national unity in the memory of expelling the “Polish occupiers” from Moscow in 1612! Simultaneously, they issue threats of nuclear attacks against new potential adversaries, namely the Americans.

Interestingly, their celebrations do not extend to the expulsion of other historical foes such as the Mongols, Tatars, French, Swedes, Turks, Cossacks, or Germans, but focus solely on the Poles. This is curious, especially considering that it was Napoleon Bonaparte’s forces that occupied and devastated Moscow, inflicting far greater destruction than the Poles ever did. In fact, commemorating the retreat of Napoleon’s army in 1812 would seem a more appropriate basis for fostering national unity. Yet, this is not the case. Why, then, have the Poles been given this “honour”? One might argue that the unity of the Russian nation could be more effectively reinforced by recalling the expulsion of Germans from Soviet borders in 1944. Instead, it is the defeat of the Poles that is portrayed as a source of pride for all Russians, including Kalmyks, Bashkirs, Caucasians, Chechens, and Tatars.

The Poles have been designated as Russia’s quintessential enemy, and it has been decided that their defeat serves as a reason to celebrate Russian national unity. This raises questions about the motivations behind this choice and how it can be understood.

Russia’s Ethnic Diversity

From the perspective of Russia’s president, leading a multinational and multireligious state, the establishment of a holiday focused on unity appears both rational and necessary. For Russia as a nation, such a holiday is vital. Here are some key facts about the national and ethnic composition of the Russian Federation: Russia is home to 140 million people, making it one of the most ethnically diverse countries worldwide. Over 190 ethnic groups and nationalities reside on its territory, each differing in language, culture, and traditions. Ethnic Russians constitute the largest group, accounting for about 60% of the population. Russian serves as both their native and the country’s official language.

Most ethnic Russians identify as Orthodox Christians, although there are also many atheists and followers of other faiths. The country is home to Ukrainians and Belarusians, as well as several Caucasian peoples, including Chechens, Ingush, Dagestanis, and Ossetians, who primarily reside in the North Caucasus. These groups speak their own languages and dialects and have strong national identities, with the majority being Sunni Muslims. The largest non- Slavic group in Russia is the Tatars, who represent about 3-4% of the population. They mainly inhabit Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, speak both Tatar and Russian, and follow Sunni Islam. The Bashkirs, another Turkic group, primarily reside in Bashkortostan but can also be found in other regions. They are mainly Sunni Muslims. Indigenous peoples of Siberia and the Far East include the Evenks, Yakuts, Buryats, and Tuvans.

Despite their small numbers, they significantly contribute to Russia’s cultural diversity, with many still engaging in traditional lifestyles such as reindeer herding, hunting, and fishing. Other ethnic and national groups residing in Russia include Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other post-Soviet immigrants from Central Asia, who constitute a significant portion of Russia’s population. Russia has numerous autonomous regions, such as republics (e.g., Tatarstan, Buryatia, Komi, Chechnya), which formally allow some ethnic groups to preserve their language and culture.

However, in an attempt to unite the diverse peoples of Russia under a national holiday, Putin chose an event from the era of the Tsars—an empire that conquered these very groups. Rather than establishing a holiday that genuinely reflects the multinational character of the state stretching across Europe and Asia, he chose an event rooted solely in Russian history, seemingly untroubled by the potential backlash of reviving Tsarist imperial traditions. Perhaps that was his intention all along. Perhaps he wanted to signal that Russia, under his rule, will reclaim its imperial status, a status that originated in the 17th century? Perhaps, at the start of the 21st century, Putin has little else to offer the peoples of Russia except a reminder of Moscow’s supremacy? This holiday, therefore, is a celebration of Russian imperialism. On November 4, Russia’s colonial nature is put on full display.

Celebrations

 Over the past 20 years, a particular way of celebrating this holiday has developed. It is dictated by the authorities, leaving no space for spontaneous social activities. The government closely monitors all events, with the ruling elites determining the key elements of the National Unity Day celebrations in Russia

Official State Ceremonies

In major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg, official state ceremonies are held, with the most significant ones taking place in Moscow. The celebrations commence with a solemn ritual of laying flowers at the monument to the liberators of 1612— merchant Kuzma Minin and Prince Dmitry Pozharsky— located in Red Square. This monument honours the leaders of the grassroots resistance movement who were instrumental in Moscow’s liberation in 1612. Designed by sculptor Ivan Martos, it was unveiled in 1818 as the first secular monument in Russia, highlighting the historical importance of the event for the Russian people. Originally, the monument stood in front of St. Basil’s Cathedral on Red Square but was relocated in the 1930s to create a more open space.

The sculpture depicts Minin extending his hand in a gesture of leadership, urging Pozharsky to take action. This scene represents the unity of various social classes—Minin was a merchant from Nizhny Novgorod, while Pozharsky was a prince. It was intended to express the social solidarity of Russians in the face of external threats. The monument stands as a tribute to the heroes of Russia’s fight for independence and represents a deep respect for the nation’s history. It serves as a central point for patriotic events and state celebrations.

Charitable Events

Charitable initiatives have only recently become a part of national celebrations. On this day, numerous activities are organised to support those in need. Fundraisers are organised for children in orphanages, the elderly, and families facing financial hardships. Since 2023, funds have also been raised for soldiers on the Ukrainian front and their families.

Our Lady of Kazan

 The Orthodox Church quickly became involved in state celebrations, reflecting the deep-rooted connection between the state and the Church. This relationship is a fundamental aspect of Russian national and political identity. Over the centuries, it has evolved from a symbiotic partnership during the tsarist era, through a period of atheistic communism, to a resurgence of close ties in contemporary times.

This evolution is deeply embedded in Russia’s historical context. Following the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Moscow began to regard itself as the Third Rome, the heir to the Byzantine Empire, where secular and religious authority were closely linked. The tsars viewed themselves as defenders of Orthodoxy, while the Church acted as a cornerstone of their authority. In 1721, Peter I abolished the patriarchate and placed the Church under state control, establishing the Holy Governing Synod, which was controlled by the Tsar. After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Soviet authorities brutally persecuted the Church—closing temples, executing clergy, and suppressing religion as an opiate for the masses. During World War II, Stalin restored some freedoms to the Church to mobilise society against the Germans. After the collapse of the USSR, the Orthodox Church regained significance and became a vital element in building a new national identity.

Vladimir Putin has strengthened ties with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), using it as a tool for legitimising power and propaganda. Patriarch Kirill openly supports the Kremlin, calling Putin’s government a “miracle from God,” and justifying the invasion of Ukraine as a “holy war” to protect the Russian world. The contemporary functions of the Church in Russian politics encompass various areas. Its most significant role is promoting the ideology of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir), which claims that Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine form a “sacred Orthodox space.” This ideology serves to justify Russian expansionism.

This is linked to anti-Western propaganda. The Church portrays the West as morally corrupt, decadent, and anti-Christian, reinforcing the Kremlin’s conservative narrative. It supports state policies regarding education, culture, and family values, promoting conservatism and traditionalism. The financial dependency of Orthodoxy on the Russian state is also significant. The ROC receives numerous privileges, tax exemptions, and state support in exchange for loyalty and political backing. Today, the Russian state and the Orthodox Church form a strong alliance based on mutual support. The Kremlin grants the Church influence and privileges, while the Church legitimises power and reinforces imperial ideology. As a result, Orthodoxy in Russia is not merely a religion but also a political and propaganda tool.

A significant symbol of this relationship is the icon of Our Lady of Kazan. The cult of this icon serves as the centre of religious worship that celebrate the unity of Russia. It serves as a reminder of its historical role, as it is said to have accompanied the rebels who expelled the troops of the Commonwealth from the Moscow Kremlin in 1612. The icon of Our Lady of Kazan has become a symbol of unity and hope for victory.

Legend has it that the icon was used by Russian military leaders as a holy symbol to spiritually support their troops. It was often carried in prayer processions to bolster the morale of soldiers and motivate them to fight. Russians believe that the victory in 1612 was, in fact, the work of Our Lady. The icon has thus attained the status of a symbol of patriotism and and spiritual resilience, embodying a nation that overcame adversity, united, and defended its independence.

The icon of Our Lady of Kazan remains one of the most important religious symbols in Russia today and is revered greatly, with its cult strengthening the bond between religion and Russian national identity. Thus, it is proclaimed that Orthodoxy is the dominant religion in Russia, closely linked to the salvation of the Moscow state in the 17th century. Russian Orthodoxy aspires to be the religion of a neo-imperial state. If it were otherwise, one would expect to see ecumenical prayers from all Christian denominations present in Russia during the celebration of unity.

Furthermore, on November 4, interfaith ceremonies would be organised to welcome Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists. Unfortunately, this has not happened. Instead, despite Russia’s diverse religious landscape, only one faith—Orthodoxy—has been afforded a special status in the celebration of Russian unity.

Concerts

 In addition to official celebrations, many Russians use this holiday as a chance to unwind with family or friends. It is a day off work for most, but the government also organises various events to keep people engaged. State ceremonies include exhibitions, concerts, and festivals, with museums, galleries, and cultural centres hosting displays focused on Russian history and patriotic songs. Some regions hold festivals to showcase local traditions and crafts. Concerts are the highlight of the day,with attendance from government officials, teachers, military personnel, and police officers being mandatory. Their presence is primarily to ensure that concert halls and arenas are filled. State employees are expected to show their support for Putin.

Since this holiday is relatively new, it has not yet gained widespread acceptance.. Allegedly, Putin chose the date of 4 November to associate it with 7 November—the day of the October Revolution during the USSR. This date coincidence is intended to help create a new tradition of celebration. A special feature film from 2007, directed by Vladimir Khotinenko titled “Year 1612,” was supposed to aid in this endeavour.

The film was produced by Nikita Mikhalkov, a director favourable to Putin. He has become an active promoter of this holiday and other mass patriotic celebrations in Russia. Mikhalkov is one of the most well-known Russian directors, actors, and film producers, as well as a politically engaged figure. His work is closely tied to the history of Russia, its culture, and identity, and his political stance is controversial.

Mikhalkov gained international recognition for films that often explore themes of the Russian soul, tradition, and history. “Burnt by the Sun” (1994) is one of his most famous films, which won an Oscar for Best Foreign Language Film. It tells the story of the Stalinist purges, depicting the drama of a Red Army officer. Mikhalkov is closely associated with the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin. His conservative views and nostalgic perspective on Tsarist and Soviet Russia make him one of the main proponents of Russian policy. He supports the idea of the Russian world, emphasising the uniqueness of Russian civilisation and its historical mission.

Mikhalkov backs Putin’s government and participates in shaping the official historical narrative. He advocates conservatism and criticises Western influences on Russian culture. In his programmes and interviews, he accuses Western countries of moral decay and aggression towards Russia.

In many cities, marches are held involving patriotic, social, and religious organisations. These are pro-government in nature and serve to emphasise national unity and support for state policies. The presence of state officials, military personnel, teachers, and their families is mandatory. However, on this day, nationalists, particularly  Russian  fascists,  do  not  require  encouragement  to  celebrate.

The authorities turn a blind eye to the fact that 4 November is an opportunity for a manifestation of Russian national fascism, disguised as extreme nationalism. During so-called Russian marches, fascists express their pride in Russia and its traditions, raising anti-immigrant and xenophobic slogans. They demand Russia for Russians, wanting it to be a community exclusively of Slavs. Russian fascism accepts nationalist and authoritarian tendencies in Russian politics, which have intensified in recent years.

Manifestations of this phenomenon include the propaganda portrayal of Russia as a defender of traditional values and the Russian world (russkij mir), as well as the pursuit of dominance over neighbouring countries, viewed as part of Russia’s sphere of influence. The uniqueness and superiority of Russian culture are proclaimed, depicted as a besieged fortress under attack from the West. Russian fascists support policies of conquest and annexation, aiming to create a Slavic superpower akin to the former Soviet Union.

Poland – the Eternal Enemy

Let us try to answer the earlier question of why Poles, as enemies and occupiers, are an integral part of the celebration of Russian national unity.

Poland fits perfectly into the narrative of fostering Russian unity by highlighting an external threat. For a long time, Poland has been portrayed in Russian historical narratives as a “historical enemy.” This view of Poland and the Poles dates back several centuries and is based on key historical moments when Poland opposed Russia or directly threatened its interests. These events are often emphasised in Russia and serve to shape a negative image of Poland as a country with historical aspirations to interfere in Russian affairs.

The most significant examples of such moments include the Time of Troubles. From 1605 to 1618, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth became involved in a political crisis in Russia, stemming from issues with the tsarist succession. The Commonwealth intervened, attempting to seize control of Moscow and install Prince Władysław, son of King Sigismund III Vasa, on the tsar’s throne. This event is still invoked in Russia as an example of “Polish occupation” of Moscow. Similarly, the wars between the Commonwealth and the Tsardom of Moscow in the 16th to 18th centuries are viewed in Russia. For several centuries, the Commonwealth and Moscow fought for influence in Eastern Europe, resulting in numerous armed conflicts. These struggles were particularly frequent in the 17th century when the Commonwealth sought to maintain its dominant influence over eastern lands, placing it in opposition to Moscow, which aimed to unify Russian lands under its rule.

It is also important to remember that the destruction of the First Commonwealth—the Polish-Lithuanian state in the late 18th century (the partitions of the Commonwealth) —is viewed by Russians as a positive development. In Russian historiography, it is seen as a continuation of the struggle against the “evil” Poles who previously occupied Moscow. Although Russia was one of the main perpetrators (alongside Prussia and Austria) of the gradual incorporation of Lithuanian and Polish territories into its domain (1772, 1793, 1795), these actions are presented as positive. It was supposed to be a pacification of the “unruly neighbour,” whose aspirations for sovereignty could destabilise the Russian empire. In Russian historiography, the partitions of Poland are depicted as acts of restoring order in the region.

Russians cannot forgive Poland for the defeat in the Polish-Soviet War of 1920. After regaining independence in 1918, Poland fought against Bolshevik Russia, repelling the Bolshevik offensive in the Battle of Warsaw. In Russia, this war is often portrayed as a Polish attempt at expansion to the east, although Poland was, in fact, defending its freshly regained independence. This simplified interpretation also applies to the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Poland decisively turned towards the West, joining NATO in 1999. In the Russian narrative, contemporary actions by Poland, such as strengthening NATO’s eastern flank, are described as a continuation of historical aspirations to weaken Russia.

Enemies, Foreigners, Interveners

 National Unity Day carries a significant historical weight, serving as a reminder of the nation’s solidarity during times of threat, war, and occupation. This notion is indeed valid; however, beneath this historical facade lie narratives that often stray from the truth. It functions as a tool for manipulation. The expulsion of Commonwealth forces from the Kremlin has evolved beyond a mere commemoration of a past event—it has been transformed into something entirely different. This holiday exemplifies how historical events can be leveraged to influence contemporary politics. Let us examine what the Russian authorities aim to achieve through the manipulation of historical memory.

The liberation of Russia from “Polish occupation” serves as a universal symbol of Russia’s enduring struggle against external threats. Within Russian historiography and the broader national narrative, this event is frequently characterised as a pivotal moment, often accompanied by rhetoric that frames Poland as a historical aggressor. Celebrations of National Unity Day typically convey a message underscoring the necessity of defending Russian sovereignty and values against “foreign adversaries.” In this context, Poland—being a member of both the European Union and NATO—is sometimes depicted as an opponent of Russia and emblematic of the West, with which Russia has a long history of conflict.

Additionally, in the context of contemporary tensions between Poland and Russia, particularly stemming from Poland’s backing of Ukraine, the historical significance of National Unity Day is frequently manipulated by Russian media and politicians to incite negative sentiments towards Poland. This anti-Polish narrative is particularly pronounced in Russian propaganda and state-controlled media, which leverage this holiday to foster a sense of national unity against Western influences and to intensify hostility towards nations that support democratic aspirations in the region.

In Russian propaganda, Poland is frequently portrayed as a historical adversary that has meddled in Russian affairs, from the Time of Troubles to the Polish-Soviet War. Contemporary Russian policy often draws on this historical narrative to depict Poland not only as an enemy of Russia but also as a threat to the “Russian world” (russkiy mir) that Russia aims to establish in the region. Within certain political circles and propaganda efforts, Poland is presented as a significant threat, particularly amid current geopolitical tensions and its robust support for Ukraine. The origins of this narrative are rooted in history, but they are also shaped by contemporary international politics, which centres on the contest for influence in Eastern Europe. Poland stands as a prominent advocate for international support against Russia’s aggressive actions in the region. It actively engages on the global stage to raise awareness about the dangers posed by Russia and is among the most vocal critics of its policies. Consequently, Russian media frequently reference the so-called “Polish threat.”

In this propaganda, Poland is sometimes depicted as a nation attempting to regain its influence over Belarus and Ukraine—an argument leveraged to bolster negative perceptions of Poland among the Russian populace. As a result, Russian propaganda seeks to frame Poland as one of the most significant threats to Russia and its regional interests. This narrative, in turn, aids the Kremlin in uniting its citizens around the notion of resisting foreign adversaries. In truth, such rhetoric primarily functions to consolidate internal power and rationalise Russia’s aggressive actions on the international stage.

Conclusion

The National Unity Day serves as both a historical commemoration of national solidarity during times of crisis and a means of shaping a modern Russian identity, often positioned against perceived adversaries. Russian propaganda uses historical examples to bolster the narrative that Poland has been meddling in Russian affairs for centuries and continues to pose a threat. However, this perspective overlooks the intricate historical context, shifting alliances, and evolving national interests that have influenced political and military actions throughout history. Consequently, history is is used as a means of justifying contemporary political decisions and maintaining hostility toward Poland among the Russian public.

Even after 400 years, Russians are still encouraged to view Poles as a threat! But should the diverse nations of Russia truly unite out of fear of a long-past Polish occupation? Why should they continue to harbour fears of a threat that has long since faded? Can a lasting sense of unity in such a multiethnic state genuinely be built on fear of outsiders and enemies? The answer is unequivocally no. A nation like this cannot sustain its unity solely through fear of external foes. Nonetheless, this fear can certainly be manipulated to uphold authoritarian governance.

For Putin, it is convenient to claim that the threat from 1612 has not vanished. He contends that it may resurface, which is why Russians must rally around a strong leader. Putin aims to cultivate a sense of fear regarding enemies, knowing that Russians possess a collective instinct to unite under any authority that promises security. The rulers of Russia in the 17th century understood this dynamic, just as those in the 21st century do. Ultimately, this holiday embodies a celebration of Russian fear.

Marek Melnyk