"Poland is now completely consumed by Russophobia. They hate us; they absolutely despise us. Every single one of them. They are all victims. Their minds have been brainwashed, as if under the spell/in a state of complete delusion. They are prepared to spend their entire lives hating Russians. Sooner or later, this will pass, like a common cold, but unfortunately, the situation is as it is right now."
These absurd and deceitful remarks were made with full seriousness to Russian youth by Dmitry Peskov, the spokesperson for the President of Russia. Peskov delivered this statement on April 24, 2023, during a significant educational event in Russia—the Federal Educational Marathon “Knowledge.”
This event took place for the fifth time across five Russian cities: Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Arkhangelsk, Pyatigorsk, and Luhansk. In Moscow, speakers included the aforementioned presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov, the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Sergei Kiriyenko, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, and numerous other politicians and cultural figures. Over three days, the event attracted more than 18,000 visitors in Moscow alone, who came not only to listen to lectures but also to engage personally with representatives of Russia’s ruling elite. All of the speakers unanimously asserted that Russia is under a hybrid war, requiring sacrifices from its people and unwavering faith in the country’s potential.” They argued that knowledge serves as an antidote to the lies and distortions spread by the West amid Russia’s conflict with Ukraine.”
Russophobia – A Russian Myth
In Russian media and in statements made by politicians, the term “Russophobia,” indicative of irrational hostility, is frequently employed. It is a favourite expression of, for instance, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Notably, Russian politicians use the term “Russophobia” whenever they face criticism regarding the actions of the Russian government. According to them, criticism of the Kremlin’s policies is an irrational phenomenon. And they argue that such criticism must stem from prejudice against the Russian people. Russian state propaganda often depicts Russia as a victim of international conspiracies, leading to the perception that foreign criticism of Russia is a form of prejudice or even Russophobia. The term “Russophobia” denotes prejudice, hostility, or fear towards Russians and Russian culture.
This phenomenon stems from various historical, political, and cultural factors. It often arises in response to Russia’s aggressive foreign policies, particularly in regions affected by Russian territorial expansion, military invasions, or interference in the internal affairs of other nations, such as Ukraine, Georgia, or the Baltic states. Alleged Russophobia is framed as hostility towards Russians merely for being Russian. This idea is intended to reinforce the sense of Russian isolation in a hostile world—an image that has been cultivated for centuries. Changing this worldview appears particularly challenging in Russia, as many Russians have come to believe that their neighbours harbour animosity towards them.
In their perspective, Russophobia is almost innate. It is perceived as a disorder, a form of social aggression against Russians transmitted through some biological mechanism—an aggression that engenders irrational prejudices. Consequently, in Russian political and media narratives, the term “Russophobia” is wielded as a tool to distort reality and suppress any criticism of Russia. In practice, accusations of Russophobia serve to score political points both domestically and internationally. In this manner, Russia seeks to present itself as the victim of unjust and irrational criticism, attributing any actions by other countries opposing Russian interests to a persecutory stance against Russia.
Putin’s Decree
The battle against Russophobia has even been formally decreed by Putin as a legally binding directive in Russia. On December 28, 2024, Putin signed a decree concerning the new “Strategy for Countering Extremism in the Russian Federation.” This document incorporates the term “Russophobia” along with a detailed definition. In Section IV, which elucidates the terminology used, Point 6 defines Russophobia as follows: “A prejudiced, hostile attitude towards Russian citizens, the Russian language, and Russian culture, including aggressive attitudes and actions by certain individuals and political forces, as well as discriminatory actions by the authorities of states unfriendly to Russia.”
Thus, according to this decree, Russophobia is identified as one of the tools employed by extremist and terrorist organisations “as a means of conducting hybrid wars to achieve selfish geopolitical goals, including interference in the internal affairs of other states.” The document identifies Ukraine as a state that allegedly exploits extremism, explicitly referring to it as “the main source of extremism.” The document enumerates the threats arising from “the widespread dissemination of neo-Nazi ideas and the strengthening of radical neo-Nazi armed formations,” in Ukraine, among others. Furthermore, extremist groups in Ukraine, allegedly threatening Russia, are said to be inspired by “external forces that encourage crimes on Russian territory.” Putin argues that the “Ukrainian crisis” is being utilised by “unfriendly states to wage hybrid wars against the Russian Federation and to fuel aggressive Russophobic sentiments worldwide.”
Hence, Russia’s actions aim to “eliminate the source of extremist threats emanating from Ukrainian territory.” Section 21 of this document highlights protests as “one of the main ways of destabilising the socio-political situation in Russia.” Moreover, protests are described as “deliberately transformed into mass riots.” Putin claims that such activities result from “the unfavourable situation caused by the illegal activities of migrants” in Russia, as well as from actions by international non-governmental organisations and “Russian associations under their control.” The document also outlines the forms of this influence, stating that extremist influence on Russia is exerted “under the guise of humanitarian, educational, cultural, and religious projects.”
Polish “Disease”
Poland is depicted as a place where this “disease” spreads particularly vigorously. The accusation of spreading Russophobia in Poland is a complex issue, encompassing both myths and realities. The Kremlin utilises the charge of Russophobia as a propaganda tool to discredit criticism of Russian actions, especially those related to foreign policy. Some in Europe have already accepted this anti-Polish narrative. They assume that Poles cannot objectively assess Russia due to prejudice and a lack of rationality regarding their eastern neighbour. The disregard for Poland was clear when the country voiced opposition to Russian and German initiatives concerning Nord Stream 1 and 2. Criticism of Germany’s energy policy, which was based on uncritical cooperation with Russia, was framed as “filled with Russophobia,” in a bid to undermine Polish arguments. The Kremlin continues to systematically employ this term to delegitimise Polish foreign policy, claiming that Poland is motivated by irrational animosity towards Russia.
Polish society generally views Russia with considerable scepticism. Public opinion polls indicate that Poles often perceive Russia as a threat, primarily due to its foreign and domestic policies. However, it is crucial to note that these attitudes do not arise from prejudice against Russians as a people but rather from a critical assessment of the Russian government’s actions. There is also a keen interest in Russian culture, literature, and art in Poland, suggesting that Polish distrust is fundamentally political rather than social or cultural. Poland’s policy towards Russia is not driven by irrational hatred, as often suggested by the Kremlin, but rather by a pragmatic assessment of the geopolitical landscape and associated threats. As a member of NATO and the European Union, Poland aims to uphold its sovereignty while ensuring the security of the Central and Eastern European region. A key element of this policy is the reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank. Poland plays a vital role in enhancing NATO’s military presence on its territory to deter potential Russian aggression. Support for Ukraine is equally crucial. Poland actively backs Ukraine both politically and economically, recognising that a sovereign, democratic Ukraine is essential for regional stability. Additionally, Poland has diversified its energy sources. It has reduced its dependence on Russian energy by developing alternative energy solutions and collaborating with other countries in the region.
Dislike Has Rational Causes
Although Russian propaganda accuses Poland of Russophobia, Polish society and political elites have numerous rational, fact-based reasons for maintaining a skeptical stance toward Russia.. Many of these reasons are historical, yet contemporary Russian actions also exacerbate these concerns. This is not an irrational viewpoint. On the contrary, it is a fundamentally realistic stance. Here are some of the sources of this Polish realism regarding Russia.
Historic memory
Poland’s historical experiences with Russia and the Soviet Union significantly shape its current stance towards Moscow. For centuries, Poland existed within Russia’s sphere of influence, which often led to conflicts. Key moments include the partitions of Poland, where Russia played a central role, resulting in Poland’s disappearance from the map of Europe for over 120 years.
These events incited national uprisings against Russian rule in the 19th century. Furthermore, Poles harbour fears of Russia due to the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, followed by the occupation of Poland’s eastern territories and mass repressions, epitomised by the Katyn massacre. This apprehension was further reinforced during the communist era (PRL), when Poland was a satellite state of the USSR, devoid of political sovereignty. Such historical events have left profound marks on Poland’s collective memory, fostering enduring distrust towards Russia.
Russia’s Foreign Policy
Russia’s actions, including the war in Chechnya, the 2008 war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, support for separatists in Donbas, and the 2022 war in Ukraine, are widely condemned in Poland. This naturally contributes to the rise of negative sentiments towards Russia. However, this response is not irrational; it is a manifestation of common sense. Poles are particularly concerned about war crimes and Russia’s violations of human rights. These factors exacerbate negative attitudes towards Russia, not only in Poland but globally.
Poland’s Role in Europe
Since 1989, Poland has been one of the most active proponents of integration with the West, particularly with NATO and the European Union. Conversely, Russia perceives these institutions as threats to its sphere of influence. Key events that shape Poland’s current stance towards Russia include the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, both of which Poland has unequivocally condemned, viewing them as threats not only to its neighbour but also to the stability of all of Europe. Poles were wary of Russian energy blackmail, believing that Nord Stream 2, which connects Russia with Germany, would increase Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, potentially serving as a tool for political pressure through price manipulation. Additionally, Poles are rightly concerned about Russia’s hybrid warfare, which aims to spread disinformation and destabilise Europe. Russia’s influence on domestic politics and its destabilisation of other countries (e.g., through cyberattacks) are perceived in Poland as direct threats.
Polish Self-Accusations
However, it is important to acknowledge that some individuals in Poland believe that Polish Russophobia is a genuine phenomenon. One such example is Professor Stanisław Bieleń, a political scientist specialising in international relations, who has authored, co-authored, and edited works such as “The International Identity of the Russian Federation,” “Russia During the Presidency of Vladimir Putin,” “Russia’s Foreign Policy,” “Russia – Reflections on Transformation, and International Images of Russia.” He also serves as the editor-in-chief of the quarterly “International Relations.” Recently, he has published pro-Russian articles in “Myśl Polska.” Bieleń previously served as a frequent commentator on Russian-Ukrainian issues for the Onet.pl portal. The titles of his articles published on this site are a testament to his contributions.
“Professor Stanisław Bieleń: Russophobia is a widespread phenomenon in Poland” (interview from March 2014), “Professor Stanisław Bieleń: This is a phenomenon the West does not understand (on the cultural and civilisational unity of Russians and Russian-speaking peoples,” February 2015), Professor Stanisław Bieleń: “In many ways, Ukraine is on the brink of collapse,” (March 2014), “Stanisław Bieleń: We cannot help Ukraine at any cost (August 2014, also discussing Poland’s “submissiveness” to the U.S.), “Professor Stanisław Bieleń: The fate of Crimea has been decided” (March 2014), Professor Stanisław Bieleń for Onet: “Russia is responding to the West’s actions” (February 2015), “Professor Stanisław Bieleń: Let’s think about our own national interest” (August 2014).
In the 2014 interview, he characterised Polish Russophobia as follows: “It is the result not only of deep-rooted historical layers and psychological complexes but also of daily upbringing at home, in schools, in churches, etc. Russophobic sentiments, varying in intensity across different historical periods, are unfortunately a permanent feature of traditionally understood Polish identity. It is an element of national identity, a criterion defining the ‘true’ patriotic stance. Russophobia is a trend whose validity is seldom questioned. (…). Just look around and listen to what friends, uncritical TV presenters, and so-called experts say about Russians, broadcasting insults and insinuations to the public.
The public discourse is characterised by the pejorative framing of Russia and Russians, the creation of negative images, a lack of alternative perspectives, and the labelling of Russia as the embodiment of evil. This is accompanied by a deliberate conflation of anti-Sovietism with anti-Russian sentiment. The demonisation of Vladimir Putin as the cause of all misfortunes (as an enemy of democracy, human rights, and tolerance, and now as an ‘aggressor,’ ‘madman,’ ‘thug,’ and ‘predator’) is a hallmark of this caricatured political and media culture. Polish historical memory equates Russia with an enemy, a repressive and aggressive state. It appears that for many, Russophobia is a political necessity without which they cannot function in public life. (…) Most Poles remain mentally shackled by archaic, stereotypical, often surreal, and extremely simplified perceptions of Russia. It is striking how few individuals in Poland are interested in reversing these negative and harmful trends that tarnish Poland’s international image. Little is being done to counteract these obsessions, fears, and phobias that hinder the perception of Russia as a normal country with the right to define its own interests, even when they conflict with Poland’s.”
In response to this diagnosis, Bieleń proposed dialogue:
“Given the widespread Russophobia in Poland, there is a need for memory therapy to free it from harmful obsessions and fears regarding Russia. One attempt at para-diplomatic support for Polish-Russian reconciliation was the establishment of the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters in 2002 and its reactivation in 2008. Artyom Malgin, representing the Russian side, viewed mutual respect and understanding in interpreting historical events, without yielding to political pressure, as the supreme value of Polish-Russian historians’ advisory work. However, it remains uncertain whether historians from both sides can shift their focus from the past to the future. (…) So far, no one is contemplating how mutual rapprochement could lay the foundations for peaceful coexistence for future generations. Each side’s insistence on its own version of historical truth and demands for moral (and material) satisfaction obstruct progress towards normalisation and reconciliation. Intransigence breeds stubbornness, and fanaticism leads to confrontation and escalating tensions. Polish public opinion, largely shaped by politically motivated media, does not recognise that displaying arrogance and promoting a single, absolute truth yields only short-term benefits. It is irrational to view stubbornness, intransigence, and a negative attitude towards Russia’s political leadership as expressions of Poland’s strength and significant position in Europe. Similarly, it is absurd to regard readiness for dialogue and compromise as signs of weakness and servility.”
The author also suggested contemplating the future. When Russia initiated military actions in Ukraine in 2014, he proposed: “(…) reconsidering the validity of war rhetoric against Russia. Such rhetoric easily serves Russophobic propaganda but does not lead to positive political outcomes in the long term. Poland is capable of assessing the situation calmly and with restraint. Anti- Russian emotions are poor advisors in effective diplomacy. Moreover, the crisis will eventually end—this is the nature of crises—and Poland will still be Russia’s neighbour. It must consider its interests with Russia, not merely focus on external affairs, because—whether we like it or not—the Ukrainian issue is ultimately not ours. More realism and less moralising would be beneficial. This is not the first time in history. One must, above all, understand the price of one’s national interest rather than brandishing a sword for public applause and the personal satisfaction of politicians.”
In 2014, philosopher Bronisław Łagowski stated:
“Russophobia in Poland is intensifying. Since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, surveys have recorded a steady increase in anti-Russian sentiments. Of course, these do not stem from real-life conditions, as serious opinions do. Serious opinions arise from what is actually happening. And in Polish-Russian relations, nothing has occurred that would justify the rise of Russophobia. Russophobia is now a state ideology.
The Polish state has adopted a political orientation accompanied by corresponding propaganda. This propaganda knows no bounds, no moderation, and disregards plausibility. The media have descended into a kind of intellectual darkness. Russophobia is also the fundamental lens for interpreting current and historical events. Even in interwar Poland, despite the real threat from Bolshevik Russia—where nearly constant border skirmishes occurred and soldiers were dying—there was no such anti-Russian hysteria. There was no hysteria at all, just a realistic view of the situation.”
The Anti-Polish Myth
Accusations of Polish Russophobia are largely a myth propagated by Russian authorities to discredit Poland’s concerns and actions regarding Russian policies. In reality, Poland’s scepticism towards Russia is grounded in genuine historical experiences and current geopolitical threats. Poland’s policy towards Russia is driven by the desire to ensure security, sovereignty, and regional stability— threatened by the imperialist and nationalist policies of those in the Kremlin— not by irrational hatred or hostility towards Russia as a nation.
Marek Melnyk
COMMENTS