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Sowers of Hate. Who seeks to conflict Poles and Ukrainians?

Nikogo nie może dziwić otwarte dążenie Rosji do poróżnienia i skonfliktowania Polaków i Ukraińców. To oczywiste i zrozumiałe samo przez się. Obowiązuje tutaj zasada „Разделяй и властвуй” („Divide et impera”, czyli „Dziel i rządź”). Kreml chce też przy tym rozbić jedność Unii Europejskiej, osłabić NATO, ograniczyć obecność USA w Europie. Szczególnie rosyjskie media, ustawicznie powielając cele polityczne Moskwy, głoszą istnienie niemożliwej do przezwyciężenia nienawiści między Polakami i Ukraińcami. Według Rosjan ma być ona zakodowana genetycznie.

No one should be surprised by Russia’s overt attempts to create division and incite conflict between Poles and Ukrainians. This is both evident and entirely understandable. The principle at play here is “Разделяй и властвуй” ("Divide et impera"—"Divide and rule"). At the same time, the Kremlin also seeks to undermine European Union unity, weaken NATO, and limit the U.S. presence in Europe. Russian media, consistently echoing Moscow’s political objectives, propagate the idea of an insurmountable animosity between Poles and Ukrainians, allegedly embedded in their very genetics.

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The Russian public is continuously bombarded with information suggesting an inevitable and open conflict between the two nations—it is portrayed as merely a matter of time. Through a deluge of propaganda films, videos, commentary, and “expert” analyses, an image of escalating hostility, resentment, prejudice, and ultimately hatred between Poles and Ukrainians is constructed.

To avoid being unsubstantiated, one needs to only consider a Russian-produced propaganda film aimed at inciting animosity between Poles and Ukrainians, titled “Shocking Hypotheses: Why Do Poles Hate Ukrainians?” The film was released on April 12, 2024, on the Yapolitic.ru portal. This portal is noteworthy in itself, serving as a hub for viewers to access broadcasts from all major Russian television stations. What is more, it is meticulously curated to provide themed programmes, ensuring that anyone interested in politics has immediate access to Russian political commentary and favourite journalists. Here, one can effortlessly hear what Putin or Lavrov have to say—the desired content is skillfully delivered to the audience. This exemplifies the methodology of Russia’s expansive propaganda machine, designed to indoctrinate its own society.

Igor Prokopienko – The Face of Russian Propaganda

A prominent figure in this film is Igor Prokopienko (Ігор Станіславович Прокопенко)—a particularly colourful character. He is one of the leading propagandists promoting Russia’s imperial ideology through a return to paganism, the cult of Putin as a superhuman figure, and various pseudo-scientific theories— including the claim that the Earth is flat. He has a particular affinity for advancing Russian messianism and apocalyptic narratives, often incorporating conspiracy theories that are prevalent in Russia.

Prokopienko is the creator of multiple films in the “Shocking Hypotheses” series, with titles such as “When Will America Collapse?”, “Ukraine: The Secrets of U.S. Laboratories”, and “How Ukraine Will Destroy Europe”. In these works, he disseminates Kremlin disinformation, including the assertion that the U.S. established biological weapons labs in Ukraine, a claim used to justify Russia’s invasion. He also contends that Ukraine is escalating towards nuclear conflict and developing a so-called dirty bomb. This is how he tries to be a zealous supporter of Kremlin disinformation. He diligently spreads lies that mask Russia’s true objectives.

The Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives gave him 7.5 million rubles (€700,000) for a series of lectures called “Conversations About the Most Important Things with Igor Prokopenko,” which he gives all over Russia. The lectures are all about the war in Ukraine. Our editor thinks he knows when and how it will all finish.

The film compiles some of the most egregious falsehoods regarding Polish- Ukrainian relations. Rather than exploring hypotheses and seeking evidence to confirm or refute them, the film operates under the presumption that the truth has already been established. The author knows the truth. He claims to know what Poles think about Ukrainians without conducting any academic research or factual investigation. He doesn’t have to look for evidence. His approach involves selectively distorting reality to align with his preconceived conclusions, subjecting viewers to aggressive and manipulative persuasion. This deliberate misrepresentation of facts serves a clear agenda.

The hypothesis, now presented as a thesis, has become a tool of manipulation that structures the entire communication system between the author and the viewers of his programme. They must believe in the author’s omniscience. The objective of these actions is to shake up Polish-Ukrainian relations, lessen Poland’s support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia, and create distrust between the neighbouring countries. In truth, many of the stories in the film are exaggerated or completely false. The partnership between Poland and Ukraine remains strong.

In support of the aforementioned theses, the film addresses several issues. The author highlights historical Polish-Ukrainian antagonisms, focusing primarily on the Volhynia massacre and the activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

The Volhynia massacre was a genocide perpetrated by Ukrainian nationalists, often with the active support of the local Ukrainian population, against the Polish minority in the Volhynia Voivodeship. This mass atrocity occurred during the German occupation of the territory from August 1941 to February 1944, which was part of the Third Reich’s occupation structure (Reichskommissariat Ukraine). The victims of the massacres, which peaked in the summer of 1943, were predominantly Poles, but also included, to a lesser extent, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Armenians, Czechs, and other nationalities residing in Volhynia. While the exact number of victims remains unknown, historians estimate that approximately 50,000 to 120,000 Poles were killed, with Ukrainian estimates suggesting that 20,000 to 30,000 Ukrainians also perished.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was an armed formation active between 1942 and 1954, associated with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. It emerged as a partisan force fighting for Ukraine’s independence, primarily against the Germans, the USSR, and the Poles. UPA is particularly controversial in the context of Polish-Ukrainian relations due to the mass atrocities committed against the Polish population, especially during the Volhynia massacre (1943-1944), in which between 50,000 and 100,000 Poles were killed. Simultaneously, UPA also fought against the Red Army and the NKVD, suffering significant losses between 1944 and 1950.

The Russian propagandist highlights the tragedy of the Volhynia massacre, depicting Ukrainians as adversaries of Poles who glorify Stepan Bandera (1909– 1959). Bandera was a Ukrainian nationalist activist and a prominent leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. He advocated for Ukraine’s independence, often employing radical methods. During World War II, his supporters declared Ukraine’s independence in Lviv in 1941, but he was swiftly arrested by the Germans and imprisoned in Sachsenhausen concentration camp. After the war, he lived in exile, primarily in Germany. In 1959, he was assassinated in Munich by a KGB agent. His legacy remains contentious—some view him as a symbol of Ukraine’s fight for independence, while others hold him accountable for crimes, particularly against Poles and Jews.

However, the propagandist shortly after abandons any pretence of concern for the fate of the Polish people and instead shifts focus to alleged Polish territorial ambitions regarding Ukraine. The misleading propaganda that spills from the film implies that Poland seeks to reclaim western Ukraine, aiming to instil distrust among Ukrainians towards Poles. To substantiate this assertion, the film showcases fabricated maps of Ukrainian territories that are allegedly intended for annexation by Poland. Furthermore, it highlights religious differences, claiming that the divide between Catholicism (Poland) and Orthodoxy (Ukraine) is so pronounced that it results in a lack of shared cultural values, which is clearly untrue. Ukrainians are depicted as culturally distinct from Poles, suggesting that both sides struggle to understand one another.

The propagandist seeks to portray Ukrainian refugees in Poland as both an economic and social burden, suggesting that Polish citizens may feel exploited. His aim is to instil a sense of war fatigue in Poland, insinuating that support for Ukraine is detrimental to the Polish economy. To support this thesis of mutual animosity, stereotypes are employed. The filmdepicts Poles as arrogant towards Ukrainians, treating them merely as cheap labour, while Ukrainians are characterised as ungrateful and entitled, aiming to provoke social tensions. The author takes advantage of media incidents—such as farmer protests at the border, the dumping of Ukrainian grain, disputes among refugees, and local demonstrations—exaggerating these events as evidence of a supposed divide between the two nations.

The film also accuses Polish forces of committing numerous crimes in Ukraine between 2022 and 2024. It claims that 3,000 Ukrainians—allegedly soldiers who refused to fight—were executed by Polish troops. The film asserts that Polish soldiers operate behind the front lines, killing deserters and escapees, drawing a comparison to Russian “barrier troops” made up of Kadyrovites. This comparison of Polish soldiers to Kadyrovites (Chechens loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya, a republic within the Russian Federation) is a deliberate manipulation. These forces, primarily special and paramilitary units, are formally under the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs but are, in practice, loyal to Kadyrov, a close ally of Putin.

This military formation emerged after the Second Chechen War (1999– 2009), when Kadyrov took control of the republic as a Kremlin ally. They are notorious for their brutal warfare tactics, torture, and suppression of Kadyrov’s opponents. While they actively participated in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, their actual combat effectiveness is often questioned. More focused on propaganda than frontline combat, they have faced accusations of numerous war crimes and human rights violations in both Chechnya and Ukraine.

The filmmaker aims to persuade viewers that the Ukraine-Russia conflict fundamentally represents a struggle between East and West. Poland aligns itself with the West, particularly the United States, while Ukraine is portrayed as being temporarily under the influence of Russia, albeit controlled by fascists who must be expelled from Kyiv. Poland is depicted as a mere instrument to sever Ukraine’s ties with Moscow, suggesting that a Polish-Ukrainian conflict is inevitable in the near future. The signs of this tension are already becoming apparent. The filmmaker’s objective is to incite Poles to engage in disputes with Russians over Ukraine. It is reiterated that Ukraine could not avoid the misfortune of war, as throughout its history it has been the subject of dispute between Poles and Russians. A Russian victory, it is claimed, could resolve this conflict and restore peace, albeit at the cost of distancing Poland from Ukraine. The logic surrounding the East-West conflict is presented as paramount, offering an explanation for the ongoing turmoil. This enduring East-West conflict is held responsible for the ongoing war. Russian propaganda seeks to exacerbate the crisis. Prokopenko believes in the power of fueling hidden fears and insecurities. He tries to activate them to divide Poles and Ukrainians. His efforts began even prior to 2022. Hisambitions are modest; he merely aims to undermine Ukrainians’ confidence in the benevolent intentions of Poles. Ultimately, his primary objective is to instil distrust, fostering suspicion among Ukrainians towards Poles.

What Do Ukrainians Really Think About Poles?

 And what is the truth regarding the perceptions both nations hold of one another? What are Ukrainians’ views on Poland and Poles? Do we have access to this knowledge, or are we destined to rely on Russian disinformation that manipulates conflicting economic interests and historical anxieties? Fortunately, objective truth is attainable. There are credible sociological studies. Studies commissioned by the Mieroszewski Center in 2024, which we have access to, provide us with valuable insights into Polish perceptions of Ukrainians and vice versa.

Polish Perspectives on Ukrainians

 Research into Polish perceptions of Ukrainians has revealed notable shifts in public opinion regarding both Ukraine and its people. Various factors contributing to these changes have been identified, with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war emerging as a significant influence on Polish attitudes towards Ukrainians. According to a recent survey, 40% of Poles believe that the protracted conflict between Russia and Ukraine has negatively affected the perception of Ukrainians in Poland. This sentiment resonates with 25% of respondents.

The findings indicate a growing sense of war fatigue among Poles concerning Ukraine, highlighting the urgency to address internal issues within Poland. In 2024, Poles began to acknowledge the economic conflicts of interest arising between Poland and Ukraine. This was particularly evident during protests by Polish transport companies and farmers at the Polish-Ukrainian border. The survey also revealed that 54% of respondents viewed Poland’s military aid to Ukraine positively, while 26% advocated for its cessation.

The research further emphasised that unresolved historical conflicts, such as the Volhynia massacre, negatively influence Polish perceptions of Ukrainians. It revealed significant concerns among Poles regarding the integration of Ukrainians within Poland. Notably, 44% of respondents felt that the social assistance provided to Ukrainians in Poland was excessive, indicating a prevalent sentiment of unease. Additionally, there were calls for the establishment of a more equitable social policy concerning Ukrainian refugees in Poland. Research revealed that 63% of respondents were in favour of Ukraine’s accession to the EU, while 62% supported its membership in NATO. However, this backing was not unconditional; there were calls for Ukraine to implement internal reforms, particularly in combating corruption.

Most importantly, Poles expressed a desire for Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the EU to occur only after the conclusion of the war. Consequently, it is evident that Polish attitudes towards Ukrainians are divided. Two primary perspectives prevail. The first reflects an understanding and support for the necessity of assisting Ukraine in its struggle against Russia. The second encompasses concerns regarding the sacrifices required for such support, potential economic conflicts, and the need to safeguard Polish interests while managing the integration of Ukrainian refugees in Poland.

Ukrainians on Poles

 The sociological study titled “Poland and Poles through the Eyes of Ukrainians 2024” is not new. It is a continuation of similar research conducted in 2022 and 2023. The survey involved 1,000 respondents and was carried out in the first half of November this year. The research found that 41% of Ukrainians have a positive view of Poland and Poles (4% have a very good opinion, and 37% a good one). In 2023, 67% of Ukrainians expressed the same positive attitude toward Poles.

In 2022, this figure was 83%.Thus, between 2022 and 2024, there was a significant decline in Ukrainians’ positive perception of Poles—a difference of 42 percentage points. When asked whether Poland intends to take control of western Ukraine, 60% of respondents firmly stated that this was untrue, while 30% acknowledged a slight possibility, and 4% expressed belief in Poland’s supposed ambitions to partition Ukraine.

The reasons behind Poland’s support for Ukraine also yielded intriguing responses. 20% of participants selected the option: “Poland views certain Ukrainian territories as its own.” In contrast, a significant 72% believed that Poland’s motivation to assist Ukraine stems from a fear of Russia. From the Polish viewpoint, the responses regarding which countries provide the most aid to Ukraine were particularly noteworthy. In this context, 34% of respondents identified the UK as the largest supporter, 29% credited Germany, and 23% placed Poland in the top position. Only 3% selected France.

A significant majority (86%) of Ukrainians surveyed believe that Poland will continue to be their ally in the war against Russia. Furthermore, 76% expressed confidence that Poland will maintain its support for Ukraine’s aspirations to join the European Union. When asked which nation they felt culturally closest to, the majority of Ukrainians identified Poles, with 46% of respondents selecting this option. Belarusians were the second most popular choice at 9%, while only 4% chose Russians. Regarding nations perceived negatively, just 2% of Ukrainians mentioned Poles—an increase of 1 percentage point since 2023. Notably, there were no recorded negative sentiments towards Poles in 2022. Interestingly, 53% of Ukrainians hold a neutral opinion about Poles.

Conclusions

 The positive perception of Poland among Ukrainians has experienced a slight shift. Many Ukrainians have expressed resentment towards Poles for blocking grain exports and restricting border access due to protests by farmers. This reaction, however, was somewhat anticipated, given the war’s toll on both societies, which may persist for an extended period, leading to fluctuating public sentiment in both Poland and Ukraine.

While the protests by Polish farmers significantly influence public mood, they do not solely define it. The emotional toll of the war, which is being exploited by Russian propaganda, aims to incite anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Poland. It is crucial to avoid sweeping emotional generalisations, as this dynamic can make the farmers’ protests in Poland seem anti-Ukrainian in nature.

Poland and Ukraine must develop a collaborative communication strategy grounded in factual information and its rational interpretation. We are not going not revert to the emotions of 2022, a time when, in response to the war in Ukraine, Poles selflessly assisted refugees and demonstrated solidarity with their suffering neighbours. The current sentiment represents a natural evolution in our mutual relations—it is more grounded in reality. Our attitudes towards one another are increasingly influenced by pragmatism. We aspire to be good neighbours, and this seems to be the direction in which our relations are progressing.

In 2022, Poland exhibited a largely positive attitude towards Ukrainians, facilitating grassroots humanitarian aid efforts. Military assistance also garnered widespread support, and Ukrainian refugees were warmly welcomed. However, two years later, the level of positive sentiment has diminished on both sides of the border. One might speculate that Russian disinformation has contributed to this change. It is noteworthy that in the analysed video, Russian propagandists highlighted the protests by Polish farmers at the border with Ukraine, fully aware that the destruction of grain holds significant symbolic meaning for Ukrainians, beyond mere economic implications.

The Kremlin’s manipulators have portrayed the spillage of Ukrainian grain as a deliberate act of humiliation directed at the Ukrainian nation. They have cynically invoked the historical memory of the Holodomor, a tragic famine during the Soviet era, to further their narrative. However, they conveniently neglect to acknowledge that it is Russia that bears responsibility for the bloodshed on Ukrainian soil—the cost of the grain being exported from Ukraine.

Marek Melnyk

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