To gain a deeper understanding of Russian anti-Polish disinformation, it is is worth looking at the views of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (Александр Солженицын, 1918– 2008), the celebrated Russian writer, dissident, and Nobel laureate in literature.
Solzhenitsyn, a Red Army soldier during World War II, was arrested in 1945 for making critical remarks about Stalin in private letters. He was sentenced to eight years in a labour camp (gulag), an experience that profoundly shaped his literary work. After his release, Solzhenitsyn lived in exile in Kazakhstan. In the 1960s, he began publishing (including One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (1962)), which established him as a symbol of the Khrushchev Thaw. In the 1970s, Soviet authorities expelled him from the country. He then resided in Switzerland and the United States before returning to Russia in 1994.
Beyond One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, his most significant works include The Gulag Archipelago (1973), a monumental account of the Soviet labour camp system that raised global awareness of Soviet totalitarianism; Cancer Ward (1968); The First Circle (1968); and Russia in Collapse (1998), a collection of essays reflecting on post-Soviet Russia.
Solzhenitsyn was a critic of both communism and Soviet totalitarianism, but also of the liberal West. He emphasised the importance of spirituality, Orthodox tradition, and Russia’s moral renewal. In his later writings, he argued that Russia should not imitate the West but should instead cultivate its own unique path. Solzhenitsyn is regarded as a witness to the crimes of communism. In Russia, his legacy is viewed with ambivalence; he is seen both as an anti-totalitarian hero and is accused of nationalism and conservatism. Following his death in 2008, he was honoured by the Russian state (Putin visited his family, and in 2018 his centenary was marked with state celebrations.).
In his essay How to Rebuild Russia? (Как нам обустроить Россию?), published in 1990 in Komsomolskaya Pravda and widely discussed, Solzhenitsyn outlined his vision for Russia’s future on the cusp of the USSR’s collapse. He foresaw the fall of the Soviet empire and advocated for the voluntary separation of Central Asian and Caucasian republics.
He believed that Russia should neither maintain them nor forcibly maintain unity, arguing that holding on to non-Russian regions was detrimental to Russia itself. Instead, he proposed building a new state based on Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and northern Kazakhstan, regions mostly inhabited by Russian-speaking and Orthodox populations. He regarded these nations as historically and culturally close, destined to form the foundation of a future Russia.
Solzhenitsyn also called for democratisation and self-government while criticising centralised power. For him, Russia’s renewal required a moral and spiritual rebirth: a rejection of the totalitarian past and a return to Christian and spiritual values. He opposed Western liberalism and capitalism in its commercial, consumerist form. As early as 1990, he warned of a demographic crisis among ethnic Russians—low birth
rates, alcoholism, and high mortality—and proposed strengthening family life, religion, and moral education as remedies. He maintained that Russia should avoid blindly imitating the West, criticising American materialism, consumerism, and lack of spirituality, and insisting that Russia should follow its own path rooted in traditional and spiritual values.
Solzhenitsyn’s Perspective on Poland
Solzhenitsyn’s attitude toward Poland remain a relatively underexplored aspect of his thought. It reveals a tension between the shared anti-totalitarian experiences of Poles and Russians and the deeply ingrained imperial perspective that shaped his worldview. Solzhenitsyn often referred to the fate of Poles in his historical analyses and political reflections, while also exhibiting a kind of instinctive apprehension towards Poland. This dualistic perception of Polish-Russian relations seems to be characteristic of Russian thought and is something that the state propaganda apparatus is well aware of and exploits.
Poles as Fellow Prisoners in the Gulag
The most favorable depiction of Poland in Solzhenitsyn’s work is found in his recollections of the Gulag. In The Gulag Archipelago, he wrote with considerable admiration about Polish political prisoners, emphasising their dignity, solidarity, and spiritual resilience. He viewed Poles as distinct among other nationalities in the camps, embodying steadfastness and cultural strength. In this sense, Poland’s fate symbolised both the suffering inflicted by the totalitarian regime and the power of spiritual resistance.
Criticism of Polish Independence Aspirations
Yet Solzhenitsyn viewed Polish political aspirations with considerable skepticism. In his political writings, particularly in How to Rebuild Russia?, he criticised the Jagiellonian tradition, which envisioned Poland as a multi-ethnic state stretching across Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian lands. He argued that such aspirations had historically led to unnecessary conflicts with Russia, and in the 19th century, to tragic uprisings that brought suffering to Poles without achieving independence.
Borders and Territorial Issues
In Solzhenitsyn’s vision, post-war Poland should accept the borders established in 1945, acknowledging its rights to western territories but relinquishing claims to eastern ones. He regarded Poland’s Eastern Borderlands (Kresy) as historically and ethnically Russian-Belarusian-Ukrainian, and he considered disputes over these territories as obstacle to normalising Polish-Russian relations.
Catholicism as Strength and Obstacle
Solzhenitsyn respected Catholicism as a cornerstone of Polish national identity. He acknowledged its role in sustaining Poland through the partitions and communist rule. Yet, as a conservative Orthodox thinker, he viewed Catholicism as foreign to the Russian spiritual world, making complete spiritual reconciliation between Poland and Russia difficult.
“Solidarity” and John Paul II
Solzhenitsyn praised the “Solidarity” movement, seeing it as a genuine national awakening rooted in tradition rather than Western influence. He also recognised the significance of John Paul II as a spiritual leader although he did not entirely share his vision of a free, democratic, and united Europe, fearing it would marginalise Russia.
Thus, Solzhenitsyn’s attitude towards Poland was complex and fraught with internal contradictions. He admired Poles for their resistance to communism but, like many Russians, harboured fears that an independent Poland could pose a threat to Russia. It seemed as though he was more wary of Poland’s ideas after communism.
Poland’s heroic fight against communism evoked his admiration, but Poland after communism did not. He worried that Poland might “infect” Slavic nations—Belarusian and Ukrainian—, whom he considered intrinsically linked to Russia, with the concept of freedom and independence. He feared Poland’s “rule over souls” in relation to these groups, which could trigger Russia’s disintegration.
Manipulations by Disinformation
Russian propaganda has frequently used Solzhenitsyn’s views to legitimise anti Polish narratives. Although his own stance was ambivalent, his criticism of Poland’s national and territorial aspirations is selectively quoted in Russian media to portray Poland as a historical aggressor. Solzhenitsyn’s thought is cannibalised by propagandists.
- Selective Quotation in Russian Media
Russian propaganda outlets often cite Solzhenitsyn’s criticism of Polish uprisings and territorial claims, while omitting his recognition of Polish suffering in the labour camps and his respect for Polish national identity. This selective quotation aims to depict Poland as a historical threat to Russia.
- Using Solzhenitsyn in Imperial Narratives
In Russian propaganda, Solzhenitsyn is presented as an authority who warned against Polish imperialism. His views on Poland’s eastern borders and territorial limitations are used to justify Russian policies toward neighbouring states, including Poland. He is portrayed as a sage who confirmed Russia’s raison d’état in its relations with Poland.
- Instrumentalization in Anti-Polish Narratives
Russian propaganda sources use several typical techniques in connection with Solzhenitsyn. A primary tactic involves selective quotation, where excerpts of Solzhenitsyn’s criticism of Poland are cited, while passages expressing respect for the Polish nation are omitted. The historical criticism in Russian-Polish relations is exaggerated.
His warnings regarding Polish national uprisings are presented as evidence of an “always aggressive Poland,” while the natural aspiration to regain independence is disregarded. The focus is on criticising territorial aspirations and historical national uprisings, while his respect for Polish identity, suffering, and freedom movements is overlooked. Quotations from Solzhenitsyn’s writings are invariably linked to criticism of Poland’s current policies.
Fragments of his writings are used in narratives suggesting that contemporary Poland is a continuation of historical Poland. In the Russian reception, Solzhenitsyn becomes a moral and historical authority whose views purportedly confirm Russian theses about the threat from Poland. Such use of his thought is a classic example of exploiting literary and intellectual authority to legitimise historical policy and propaganda.
The Demographic Context
To fully understand Solzhenitsyn’s attitude toward Poland, it is also necessary to consider his concerns regarding Russia’s demographic decline.
His concept of East Slavic unity – which he perceived as being threatened by Poland – becomes clearer when viewed in this context. Ethnic Russians constitute the majority in Russia’s “core” regions (central and north-western areas, parts of the Volga region, the Urals, and western Siberia), often accounting for 80–95% of the population. Central Russia encompasses the Moscow, Tver, Smolensk, Vladimir, Kaluga, Ryazan, Novgorod, Voronezh, Lipetsk, Tambov, Belgorod, and Kursk Oblasts. North-western Russia includes St. Petersburg and the Leningrad, Novgorod, and Pskov Oblasts. The Volga region (partially) is also an area of Russian dominance, including the Saratov, Penza, and Kirov Oblasts.
The north of European Russia, including the Arkhangelsk, Vologda, and Kostroma Oblasts, is similarly characterised by a majority Russian population. The Uralsc an also be considered a region of Russian dominance, (Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, and Perm Oblasts), although with a greater admixture of Tatar and Bashkir populations. Western Siberia (Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Kemerovo) is also an area where ethnic Russians constitute a majority, although greater diversity is evident.
These regions collectively constitute what is commonly understood as Russia proper. The second area of Russia comprises mixed regions with a significant presence of Russians but also other indigenous groups conquered by the Tsars, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, where Russians often constitute 35-45 percent alongside Tatars and Bashkirs. This “second Russia” includes eastern Siberia and the Far East. Large cities (Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok) are mainly Russian, but the entire region is home to significant autochthonous minorities (Buryats, Yakuts, Evenks).
Finally, Russia includes non Russian regions where Russians constitute a minority. The North Caucasus (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia) has a minimal Russian population, often below 5-10 percent. Yakutia (Sakha) has a Russian population of approximately 40 percent, with indigenous Yakuts forming the majority. In Tuva, Buryatia, and Kalmykia, ethnic Russians constitute either a minority or roughly half of the population. Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan were practically “cleansed” of Russian populations after the wars of the 1990s.
All of this results from Russia undergoing three unsuccessful state transformations in the 20th century: first, Tsarist modernisation; then, state communism; and after its collapse, market capitalism, which evolved into Putin’s dictatorship. Failures in modernising Russia, couples with a lack of balanced social and economic transformation, have led to a demographic collapse. Thus, the “Russian core” is is experiencing a steady demographic decline due to low birth rates, an aging population, and emigration, while Muslim and Siberian regions are growing due to higher birth rates and a younger age structure.
Consequently, within two to three decades, the proportion of ethnic Russians in the entire Federation may decline from the current approximately 72 percent to around 60 percent or less. The “Russian core” (central and north western regions, western Siberia) is systematically depopulating.
Conclusion
Solzhenitsyn’s attitude toward Poland was a complex blend of respect for its suffering and spiritual fortitude, coupled with a critical perspective on its political traditions and territorial ambitions. In his view, Poland was both a close compatriot through their shared experiences of communism and a potential rival in the political and civilisational spheres. This ambivalence underscores the inherent tension between Russian imperial ideology and the shared destiny of Central and Eastern European nations in the 20th century. While Solzhenitsyn himself held a nuanced and, in many respects, respectful view of Poland, Russian propaganda selectively presents his ideas to bolster anti-Polish narratives.
Marek Melnyk
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