Is there a common thread linking the various instances of Russian disinformation aimed at Poland? The immediate answer to this question lies in the experience of truth being held captive.
Russian disinformation demonstrates that truth is primarily perceived as an entity under constant threat. Specifically, anti-Polish disinformation vividly exemplifies that truth is first encountered as enslaved and distorted. This enslaved truth demands a battle to set it free. Therefore, truth is not an external value separate from humanity, arriving from some abstract ‘Kingdom of Objective Reality’. Instead, it is an ongoing process of establishing the conditions that allow individuals to recognise objective reality as something genuinely independent of their own will. Attaining this truth becomes a process of self-integration. Thus, truth is not a static, predefined entity but something continually re-earned. These are the conclusions drawn from encountering the systemic, centralised disinformation of an authoritarian state.
People-Lies
The battle for truth is inseparable from resistance against those who enslave it through organised deception. Disinformation is produced by intelligent people, so fighting it means tackling lies crafted by skilled actors. Who are they? They include compromised journalists, FSB officers, Russian foreign intelligence agents, and politicians such as Putin and Medvedev.
Disinformation Tactics
Disinformation in Russia has specific faces. One could therefore easily compile a list of Russian disinformation agents, some of whom are already subject to EU sanctions. These agents are directly responsible for degrading the prestige of truth not only in politics but across the broader realm of culture, and they show astounding shamelessness in delivering lies. Russian disinformation is a deliberate and organised campaign to sway public opinion, destabilise societies, and advance the Kremlin’s political and strategic goals. It is a key component of what is often called an “information war,” which, alongside military and economic measures, forms a core part of Russia’s hybrid strategy.
The main aims of Russian disinformation are to erode trust in government bodies, the media, NATO, and the EU. It seeks to create information chaos that makes it harder to access reliable information. It also aims to polarise societies by exaggerating political, social, and cultural differences. Furthermore, it promotes pro-Russian narratives, such as praising the Kremlin’s actions or discrediting political opponents, and undermining support for Ukraine by spreading false information about the war, refugees, or sanctions against Russia.
Key tactics involve spreading fake news and manipulated information. Russia also uses internet trolls – groups or individuals who create and amplify pro-Russian messages on social media, as well as bots, which are automated accounts that spread propaganda. Russian propaganda manipulates images and videos, using advanced techniques such as deepfakes and fabricated recordings. Local media outlets are used to push narratives that align with the Kremlin’s interests. Conspiracy theories are spread, promoting, ideas about hidden Western agendas or imaginary threats to Russia’s security.
During the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russian disinformation has manifested in the form of false allegations made against Ukrainian refugees following 2022, such as fabricated reports of crimes committed in Europe. The narrative that NATO bears responsibility for the war’s outbreak is also being actively promoted. Previously, Russian audiences were falsely led to believe that U.S.-operated biolabs in Ukraine were supposed to be engaged in the production of biological weapons. This stream of lies will persist, as Russian propaganda constructs a distorted reality tailored to the needs of war. Consequently, these manufactured lies bear no resemblance to the truth, presenting a distorted view of the world. Therefore, a thorough examination of this phenomenon is important.
Network Code
To effectively analyse instances of Russian disinformation targeting Poland, it is crucial to understand the network code Russia uses in its cognitive warfare against Poland. This network code comprises the characteristics, role models, values, emotions, and communication preferences that define Polish society within the information and digital space. By studying these elements, military specialists and relevant agencies can effectively influence the attitudes, decisions, and behaviours of targeted groups — a cornerstone of modern hybrid operations and psychological warfare.
Nation’s network code encompasses online communication culture, including preferred social platforms like TikTok, Twitter, and Telegram. It also includes the dominant language and communication style, whether formal or informal, and the frequency and methods of sharing information (for example, memes and hashtags). A national community’s network code must consider insights from collective psychology, including national values, symbols, historical narratives, sensitivities around specific issues like patriotism, religion, and identity, and reactions to crises, such as solidarity in the face of threats. Understanding patterns of information consumption is equally valuable in mapping a community’s network code.
Information consumption patterns include trust in specific media outlets or opinion leaders, popular information sources (traditional vs. alternative media), and the inclination to accept conspiracy theories. Those seeking to map these patterns require technological expertise in social networks and algorithms prevalent in the target country. They also work to identify the geolocation of internet traffic, analyse user data, and attempt to weaken the cybersecurity of internet infrastructure.
Cognitive Warfare
All of this serves cognitive warfare, a key element of contemporary conflicts, while analysing the network code of a national community targeted by aggression becomes a fundamental tool in modern warfare strategies. The aim of this war is to create narratives dictated by the aggressor.
Attackers exploit knowledge of the network code to produce disinformation that resonates with a community’s expectations, fears, or beliefs. Equally important is deepening existing divisions and exacerbating existing internal conflicts. This is achieved by exploiting political, ethnic, or cultural differences. It also involves encouraging specific actions such as protests or boycotts, or demotivating action by undermining morale during crises. These attacks often target critical elements of national identity, questioning core aspects of a nation’s culture and history.
Russia, with varying degrees of success, exploits the network code of Western societies to influence political choices, deepen social divisions, and create informational chaos. Campaigns are conducted to improve its image in international media, and user preferences are studied for economic and political purposes. Today, entire teams of professional disinformation operatives in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kazan work to sow anxiety and hostility—manipulating public sentiment to shape political and economic decisions.
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