Poland Does Not Want to Occupy Western Belarus and Ukraine

Poland is consistently vilified through narratives portraying Poles as extreme nationalists consumed by an irrational desire to return to Vilnius, Grodno, or Lviv. Russian media depicts Poland as a nation supporting nationalist movements in Ukraine and seeking to revise borders, particularly in western Ukraine. Russian propaganda constantly paints Poland as an aggressive country striving to strengthen its military position in the region and pursuing a confrontational policy towards Russia. Such narratives aim to discredit Poland on the international stage, stir internal unrest, and provoke tensions, particularly as Warsaw increases its support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. This also fosters a negative image of Poland in the eyes of the Russian public and among the Kremlin’s allies. Below are some examples of this disinformation.

Putin

 Putin frequently claims that Poland intends to seize Ukraine, casually making these absurd accusations during interviews, Based on his scattered statements, it is evident that he has already developed a theory of so-called “Polish expansionism” towards the east.

In 2023, Putin repeatedly accused Poland of hostility towards Russia. Russian propaganda frequently portrayed Poland as a supporter of nationalist movements in Ukraine, often accusing Poland of condoning Nazism and Banderism. Claims surfaced about the existence of nationalist groups in Poland seeking to “take over western territories of Ukraine, which Ukraine received thanks to Stalin’s decisions after World War II.” At the same time, Putin presented Russia as “the only real guarantor of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its current borders.” Allegations about nationalist groups in Poland were meant to portray Poland as a threat to regional security and to Russia and its allies, such as Belarus.

On March 13, 2024, in an interview with journalist Dmitry Kiselyov, aired on state television Rossiya 1 and by RIA Novosti, Putin explicitly stated that Poland seeks to occupy western Ukraine:

“If, let’s say, Polish troops enter the territory of Ukraine, supposedly to protect the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, or some other area, in order to relieve Ukrainian military units so they can participate in the fighting at the front line, then I believe that Polish troops will never leave”.

Russian president further claimed that Warsaw aims to reclaim lands it historically considers its own:

“They dream of wanting to reclaim those lands that they consider historically theirs, which were taken from them by the father of the nation, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, and given to Ukraine. Of course, they want to reclaim them. And if official Polish units enter, it is unlikely that they will leave.”

Putin also addressed the question about the possibility of an honest agreement with the West, emphasising that Russia would defend its interests. By doing so, Putin fuelled divisions and strengthened nationalist sentiments in Russia, portraying the West, including Poland, as intent on destabilising Eastern Europe.

Lukashenko

 Alexander Lukashenko has echoed similar rhetoric. Take for instance his statement made on 4 October 2024, during an economic visit to the agricultural town of Parokhonsk in Belarusian Polesie. This declaration showcases the unique style that characterises Father Lukashenko’s communication with the nation, making it worthy of closer examination. Responding to a resident’s question about Belarus’s readiness for military actions concerning the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Lukashenko stated:

“Oh, how the Poles treat them (Ukrainians). You remember. As I was flying here, I thought about it — the Volhynian massacre. Listen. Just think of all that happened during the war. The Ukrainians set fire to our houses. What they did on the Pripyat River under the fascists’ leadership — it’s a nightmare. And what, are we going to live with those memories forever? Remember the Volhynian massacre and look at each other like beasts? And what’s behind all this? They (the Poles) want to occupy both western Belarus and western Ukraine and rule there. That is unacceptable to us. If the Poles enter Ukraine and try to seize the west, we will help Ukraine, because we will be next.”

He then assured that he seeks peace and wants to protect Belarus from being drawn into the conflict: “My main task is to prevent being drawn into this fight, into this war. Don’t worry, we are not planning to fight with the Ukrainians. And they don’t want to fight with us. (…) We will do everything to live in peace with Ukraine. If they want it. People want it, but for now, the Ukrainian authorities, as they say, are led by the Americans.”

Lukashenko also recounted a dangerous incident during his trip from Minsk to Parokhonsk, claiming his helicopter encountered Ukrainian drones: “I see them, they are flying very low, extremely low! Probably so they will not be picked up by Ukrainian electronic surveillance. Of course, they see the helicopter: it is big, not like a drone. We arrived safely. So, I don’t really care about it, as they say. After all, shooting down the presidential helicopter means a war that the Ukrainians do not need. So I don’t think that decision-makers in Ukraine are concerned about this problem. Although, of course, what can I say, it’s unpleasant!”

It is worth noting that the President of Belarus has repeatedly used such rhetoric to provoke tensions between countries in the region, particularly Poland and Ukraine. The claim that Poles want to seize western Ukraine and western Belarus exemplifies how Minsk’s dictator reinforces his domestic position and cultivates his image in the eyes of Russia. Lukashenko warns of a Polish threat, framing himself as a defender of Ukraine! He portrays himself as the leader of Belarus, the country which plays a key role in protecting regional stability from alleged encroachment by neighbours. These statements create an atmosphere of threat while strengthening his regime. Introducing divisions between Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus is part of a wider disinformation narrative aimed at spreading distrust and fear among the nations of the region, and mobilising Belarusians against an external enemy.

Inviolability of Borders

 When confronted with basic facts, the statements by Putin and Lukashenko stand as pure disinformation. Following the dissolution of the USSR and Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991, Poland was among the first countries to recognise Ukraine as a sovereign state. The recognition of borders between the two countries was confirmed through bilateral agreements and treaties, including the 1992 Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Friendly Relations, and Cooperation, which officially recognised the borders established after World War II. Since then, the borders between Poland and Ukraine have been recognised by both countries as inviolable.

The inviolability of the Polish-Ukrainian border has not been questioned by any subsequent government. “Borders in Europe are sacred,” stated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 5, 2024. Despite historical tensions — particularly over painful events like the Volhynian massacre — contemporary relations between Poland and Ukraine are built on mutual respect for sovereignty and good neighbourly political and economic cooperation. Joint political and economic initiatives, and Poland’s support for Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression, further strengthen the stability and recognition of borders between these states. Warsaw’s message remains clear: peace cannot come at the price of violating the territorial integrity of its eastern neighbour.

The “Kresy” as War Propaganda

Putin’s and Lukashenko’s references to the alleged Polish desire to reclaim the “Kresy” fit into a fundamental propaganda narrative: that Russia is the sole defender of Eastern Slavs. The war with Ukraine, according to this narrative, is justified as protection against Western enemies — including Poland.

The term “Kresy” refers to the historical eastern territories of the Second Polish Republic (1918-1939), which after World War II fell outside Poland’s borders and today lie within Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, and Russia. The Eastern Kresy included lands of today’s western Ukraine, western Belarus, and Lithuania, including cities such as Lviv, Vilnius, Grodno, Stanisławów (Ivano-Frankivsk), Tarnopol, and Brest. The Southeastern Kresy included territories of today’s Ukraine, including Volhynia and Podolia. From the 14th to the 18th centuries, the “Kresy” were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and were multicultural home to Poles, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Jews, Armenians.

In the years 1795-1918, after the partitions of Poland, most of the Kresy came under Russian rule, while part was occupied by Austria. Between 1918 and 1939, they were part of the Second Polish Republic. In the period 1939-1945, after the aggression of the USSR against Poland (17 September 1939), they were occupied by the Soviet Union, and after the war, they were incorporated into the USSR. After 1945, as a result of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, Poland lost the Kresy to the USSR, and in return received the so-called Recovered Territories (Lower Silesia, Western Pomerania, Masuria).

The Kresy played an important role in the history and culture of Poland, being the birthplace of many outstanding figures, such as Juliusz Słowacki, Adam Mickiewicz, Stanisław Moniuszko, and Józef Piłsudski. Today, the concept of Kresy functions mainly in a historical and sentimental context, referring to the Polish heritage of these lands. However, the term often carries negative associations among Belarusians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians, who see in it the peripherality of these lands in relation to the centre, which would be Polish ethnic territories. The Kresy are, after all, the end of the reach of Polish culture.

Therefore, the false claims made by Putin and Lukashenko regarding Poland’s supposed desire to regain the “Kresy” are far from coincidental. This narrative forms a persistent element within both Russian and Belarusian propaganda efforts. Its recurrence serves a specific purpose: to diligently and steadfastly implant the myth of Slavic unity into the minds of their respective populations. When examined together, the consistency of Russian war propaganda becomes strikingly apparent. The lie about Poles wanting to return to the lands of the Second Polish Republic serves merely as a tool to justify the fight against the “Kyiv junta,” which, according to this narrative, carried out a coup and rigged elections in 2014. They also claim it is the junta itself that bombs apartment blocks and schools to blame the Russians, that hires actors to pose as captured Russian soldiers, and stages massacres, such as the one in Bucha. This primitive propaganda is spread worldwide. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov repeats these propaganda theses with stern seriousness at the UN forum. Interestingly, he has sympathetic listeners. In Europe, such narratives find acceptance in Hungary, Germany, and Serbia.

A striking example of this phenomenon can be observed in the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a German far-right party that has repeatedly been accused of pro-Russian sympathies, including supporting Vladimir Putin’s policies. Although the party officially claims that it does not support Russian aggression against Ukraine, many of its leaders and members have openly expressed pro-Kremlin views. From the beginning of the war, the AfD opposed economic sanctions imposed on Russia by Germany and the European Union, arguing that they harm Germany more than Russia. It also called for a renewal of cooperation with Moscow, especially in the supply of gas and energy. The AfD consistently opposes the supply of weapons to Ukraine, arguing that Germany should not get involved in the conflict. Party politicians suggested that peaceful negotiations should be brought about, which often coincides with the Kremlin’s narrative. Many politicians of this group maintain relations with Russian politicians and pro-government media. In public debates, politicians of this party often repeat Russian arguments, for example, that NATO provoked Russia into war. Some members of the AfD participated in events organised by Russia and pro- Russian groups in Germany.

This pattern of understanding for Russia extends beyond Germany. The continued reports of Russian war crimes in Ukraine appear to have little impact in China and Brazil. Moreover, many people in these countries choose to cooperate with Russia and spread Russian propaganda.

How to handle Russian propaganda

 Russian propaganda has been actively manipulating the history of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly since the onset of its aggression against Ukraine in 2014, to provoke discord and tensions between Poland and Ukraine. One of the key themes it exploits is the issue of the Eastern Kresy, that is, the former territories of the Second Polish Republic, which after World War II were incorporated into the USSR, and subsequently became part of independent Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. Russia seeks to stir up anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland by recalling the difficult history of Polish-Ukrainian relations, especially the Volhynia massacre and other painful events from World War II. The use of the term “Polish Kresy” may be aimed at deepening divisions and arousing nostalgia for lost territories, suggesting that Poland should harbour territorial claims against Ukraine.

This narrative is designed to destabilise Polish-Ukrainian relations — a development that serves the interests of Kremlin, which is trying to weaken international support for Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression. These efforts are part of a broader Russian strategy aimed at dividing Ukraine’s allies, especially in the context of countries such as Poland, which play an important role in supporting Ukraine on the international stage. It is important to recognise the extent of historical manipulation used by Russian propaganda in this context. Both Lukashenko and Putin deliberately propagate these falsehoods, fully aware that arousing fear of Poland is a productive and effective tool for managing Russians and Belarusians. It is also worth remembering that by frightening Ukrainians and Belarusians with the idea of a Polish “return”, the Kremlin is trying to sow resentment among Poles, suggesting that Ukrainians are ungrateful for Polish help. Therefore, we must be aware of these hidden goals behind anti-Polish disinformation. Its fundamental purpose is to cause discord and tensions between Poland and Ukraine.

Marek Melnyk