For many years, Poland has faced relentless media discreditation from the Russian Federation. One of the earliest tools employed by Russian propaganda to undermine Poland was, and continues to be, the claim that Polish clergy are converting Orthodox Russians to Catholicism. These accusations began to surface in the late 1980s, during the dissolution and collapse of the USSR.
Their intensity escalated in 2000, coinciding with Pope John Paul II’s decision to establish new Catholic dioceses in Russia, which provoked significant outrage from the Moscow Patriarchate. This was framed as a crusade against Russia.
Even today, Russia persists in accusing Poland of promoting Catholicism and pro-Western values. At this point, it is worth pausing to reflect on how European values are perceived in Russia. In post-Soviet Russia, there was a palpable fear of a sudden influx of ideas, principles, and norms that had shaped Western civilisation over centuries. These values are rooted in Greek philosophy, Roman law, Christianity, and the Enlightenment. There was a particular apprehension regarding democracy—the belief that power should emanate from the people and be exercised transparently and in accordance with the rule of law.
Individual freedoms, including freedom of speech, conscience, religion, assembly, and privacy, were not embraced. The concept of the rule of law, especially the supremacy of laws that apply equally to all, including those in power, was not understood. There was distrust toward human rights and concern about the idea of human dignity, which assumes the protection of fundamental rights regardless
of origin, race, gender, or beliefs. European humanism was formally acknowledged. After all, communism embraced the idea that human intellectual, moral, and artistic development was essential for social progress. However, individual freedom was also met with trepidation, remaining alien to the Russian mentality. Russians also exhibit a selective approach to rationalism and science.
The pursuit of knowledge through reason, logic, and the scientific method, as well as the rejection of dogmatism, was accepted. However, the post-Soviet ruling class could not subject itself to rational democratic procedures. It could not be formed based on the rational metaphysics of a democratic social contract, as is the case in Western Europe. Russia, governed by the post-communist
nomenklatura since the time of Yeltsin, could not accept this. This is entirely understandable. If there is no democratic legitimacy of power—if authority is not derived from free elections—then an amorphous “party of power” assumes control, linked to the security services, the military, and the mafia. This results in an absolute and authoritarian regime. Similarly, the free market and private
property were altered. The belief that an economy based on competition and entrepreneurship fosters prosperity and innovation has only partially been accepted, benefiting only a narrow group of oligarchs who dominate the country.
Western-style democracy could not legitimise Russia’s social structure due to the brutal politicisation of Orthodoxy. In Moscow, it was decided that Orthodoxy should fill the spiritual void left by communist ideology. However, the politicisation of religion became a tool for sanctifying politics. God and Orthodoxy were to legitimise the new post-communist power. Consequently, secularism—the separation of religion from the state, ensuring the ideological neutrality of public institutions—was rejected. The same applied to equality and tolerance, the pursuit of equality before the law and respect for cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. As a result, Russian civil society could not develop.
Active citizen participation in public life, freedom of association, and co-determination in shaping the future of the Russian community remain foreign to the Russian mentality. Due to this ideological clash, proselytism in Russia was understood more broadly than merely converting individuals to non-Orthodox faiths. A Russian converting from Orthodoxy was perceived as endorsing Western values and ideas that contradict the Russian government’s national and civilisational ideology. Russian accusations of proselytism often align with broader disinformation campaigns targeting Poland and other Western countries.
Kremlin propaganda regularly depicts Poland as a nation meddling in Russia’sinternal affairs and those of neighbouring states, promoting anti-Russian sentiments, and advocating for Catholicism alongside liberal values.
Here are some striking examples of the most severe actions taken by the Russian side:
The Missing Bishop
On September 7, 2000, alarming news broke that Bishop Andrzej Śliwiński of Elbląg had been missing for three days while travelling to Irkutsk for the consecration of the local cathedral, scheduled for September 8. This caused major concern in Poland. In Moscow, Bishop Śliwiński was supposed to transfer from one flight to another, but he never arrived at the airport and did not make contact. It was known that he had passed through passport control at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo 2 airport. A driver from the Moscow Metropolitan Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz and two priests were waiting for him at the airport in vain.
Ultimately, Polish diplomats located the bishop. They informed the press that he had checked into the Novotel hotel near Sheremetyevo 2 on Monday evening. Reuters reported that the bishop went to the Novotel because he was feeling unwell and was unaware that he was being searched for. Reports at the
time suggested that the entire incident could be attributed to transportation issues or a misunderstanding in travel arrangements. However, it was never clarified why contact with the bishop was lost or why he was found only after three days. The matter was hushed up. It was suggested that no serious events had occurred and that the disappearance was more a result of unfortunate
circumstances than intentional action. To this day, we do not know what truly transpired. We can only speculate that the bishop’s visit was deliberately obstructed to disrupt the religious ceremony. This incident served as a clear signal to Catholics in Russia regarding their place in society: they were expected to remain a subordinate religious minority, unable to assert spiritual authority
over Russians. It also demonstrated that Catholic bishops were under strict state control.
The Expulsion of Bishop Mazur
Another significant event was the expulsion of Bishop Jerzy Mazur from Russia in 2002, marking a pivotal moment in the fraught relations between the Catholic Church and both the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian authorities. On April 19, 2002, Bishop Jerzy Mazur, the head of the Diocese of St. Joseph in Irkutsk, was detained at a Moscow airport upon returning from Poland. Russian
authorities denied him entry, revoked his visa, and stated that he was on a blacklist of individuals banned from Russia. No detailed justification was provided, raising suspicions of a political motive. The expulsion was interpreted as part of broader tensions between the Vatican and Russia, particularly concerning accusations of Catholic expansion into traditionally Orthodox territories. The Moscow Patriarchate and segments of the Russian political elite were displeased with the Catholic Church’s activities in Russia, especially following the Vatican’s establishment of four new dioceses there in February 2002.
Bishop Mazur’s expulsion drew criticism from the Vatican and the international public opinion. The Holy See expressed its concern and sought dialogue with Russian authorities to resolve the issue. Ultimately, Bishop Mazur never returned to his post in Russia, and the Diocese of Irkutsk had to function without him. This incident significantly impacted Catholic-Orthodox relations in Russia and complicated Vatican-Moscow dialogue. The decision to expel Bishop Mazur sparked protests in both Poland and the Vatican. The Polish government attempted diplomatic intervention, while the Vatican condemned the move as hostile toward the Catholic Church. Pope John Paul II repeatedly called for
improved relations between Catholics and Orthodox Christians and for respect for Catholics’ rights in Russia.
The Detention of Metropolitan Kondrusiewicz
In 2020, Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz found himself at the centre of events related to protests against the regime of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus. Russian propagandist Anton Kass interpreted it as follows: “Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz left Russia in 2007 and became Archbishop of Minsk-
Mogilev. He accused the Belarusian leadership of ‘bloodshed, thousands of arrests, and severe beatings of civilians,’ and of committing a ‘grave sin.’ He called Alexander Lukashenko a ‘fraud.’ The archbishop ‘travelled to Poland to receive advice on how to destroy the country.’”
In August 2020, following his criticism of the government’s brutal actions against protesters, Kondrusiewicz, who was in Poland at the time, was denied entry into Belarus, igniting international outrage. On August 31, 2020, he was explicitly refused entry. At the border crossing, as the archbishop attempted to return to Poland, his passport was annulled. During this period, the archbishop
remained in Poland, refraining from public appearances while awaiting further developments. His fate was to be determined through diplomatic discussions between the Holy See and the government in Minsk. Pope Francis dispatched Archbishop Claudio Gugerotti to Minsk, where he met with President Alexander Lukashenko on December 17. As a result of these discussions, Belarusian authorities ultimately permitted the archbishop to return to Minsk later that month. It is noteworthy that Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz is a significant figure in the Catholic Church in Russia and Belarus, playing a vital role in the revival of Catholicism in the former Soviet Union following the collapse of communism. His work in Russia, particularly between 1991 and 2007, was characterised by achievements in establishing Catholic structures. In 1991, Pope John Paul II appointed Kondrusiewicz as the apostolic administrator for
Catholics in the European part of Russia. This period followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union, creating opportunities for religious revival in the region. As an apostolic administrator and later the Archbishop of Moscow, Kondrusiewicz was charged with the task of rebuilding the Catholic Church in Russia. His responsibilities included not only organising pastoral care and restoring or reopening destroyed and closed churches but also ensuring a space for Catholic believers, who were a minority compared to the dominant Orthodox population. During his time in Moscow, Archbishop Kondrusiewicz sought to establish relations with state authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church. However, his efforts were hindered by suspicions from both the authorities and the Orthodox
Church, which feared the spread of Catholicism in traditionally Orthodox territories. Accusations of proselytism—attempts to convert Orthodox Christians to Catholicism—frequently arose, generating tensions between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church.
In 2007, Archbishop Kondrusiewicz was transferred from Moscow to the capital of Belarus, Minsk, where he became the Metropolitan Archbishop of Minsk-Mogilev. Some observers interpreted this
change as a consequence of strained relations with the Russian authorities and the Orthodox Church, although the Vatican never officially disclosed the reasons for the decision. Kondrusiewicz himself expressed sorrow over leaving Russia, where he had devoted many years to rebuilding the Catholic Church.
Metropolitan Cyril’s Letter
The Russian state authorities have remained silent regarding the establishment of Catholic diocesan structures and the appointment of clergy of Polish origin. However, the Moscow Patriarchate has clearly perceived the presence of Polish bishops and priests as a threat to religious unity in Russia, where Orthodoxy holds a strong historical and cultural position. In response, the Moscow
Patriarchate reacted in the spirit of traditional Moscow theocracy, interpreting the establishment of Catholic Church structures as an infringement on both secular and religious authority. This perspective was documented in a special report titled “Catholic Proselytism Among the Orthodox Population of Russia”, dated June 25, 2002. The report was authored by Metropolitan Cyril, who was
then the head of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate and is now the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. Formally, it was a letter addressed to the Vatican and the Chairman of the Conference of Catholic Bishops of Russia, Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz. The report described Catholic Church activities in Russia and addressed the tensions that had emerged between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church.
Metropolitan Cyril expressed his concerns and dissatisfaction regarding Catholic activities in Russia, which he perceived as a form of proselytism. He was particularly outraged by the establishment of new Catholic structures and the expansion of Catholic dioceses in traditionally Orthodox territories, which the Moscow Patriarchate viewed as an attempt to convert Orthodox believers to Catholicism. Cyril’s letter was a response to the Vatican’s decision in February 2002 to transform apostolic administrations in Russia into fully-fledged Catholic dioceses—an act seen by the Moscow Patriarchate as a provocation and an intrusion into the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. This
decision led to a deterioration of relations between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church in Russia. Metropolitan Cyril wrote: “The issue of Catholic proselytism in the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church is one of the most serious obstacles to improving relations between the two Churches. Catholic proselytism among the traditionally Orthodox population of Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States undermines the Catholic Church’s recognition of theOrthodox Church as a ‘sister Church,’ as proclaimed by the Second Vatican Council. Representatives of the Vatican and the Catholic hierarchy operating in Russia often declare their ‘brotherly’ feelings toward the Orthodox. However, the actual situation suggests otherwise. The challenge of proselytism is compoundedby the Catholic side’s complete denial of its existence, as they interpret the term‘proselytism’ to mean the act of enticing individuals from one Christian
community to another through dishonest means, such as bribery.
Simultaneously, it is claimed that the Gospel is being preached to ‘unbelievers’ and the unbaptised who visit Catholic churches, exercising their freedom to choose a religion that resonates with them. A common question posed by Catholics is: ‘Is it preferable for these individuals to remain atheists rather thanconvert to Catholicism?’ By engaging in preaching and missionary activitieswithin Russia, rather than solely ministering to their traditional congregations(such as Poles, Lithuanians, and Germans), Catholics often invoke the very ‘missionary nature of the Church’ and refer to the command given by the Saviour to proclaim the Gospel: ‘Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit’ (Mt 28:19).”
Cyril raised several objections regarding the activities of the Catholic clergy in Russia. His primary concern was that “Catholic priests, who, as we will examine below, predominantly come from abroad, do not preach in an undefined’missionary territory’ or among a pagan or non-religious populace. They arrive ina country with a millennium-old Christian culture deeply entrenched inOrthodox traditions.”The very act of conducting a Catholic mission among alocal population that has no historical or cultural ties to the Catholic Church, alongside the presence of Catholic missionaries on Russian soil, naturally raisesan important question: Do Catholics regard the Orthodox Church as a Church?If they do, their activities appear to contradict the words of the Apostle Paul: “Iaspired to preach the Gospel only where Christ’s name was not known, so that Iwould not be building on someone else’s foundation” (Romans 15:20).
According to Cyril, it was evident that “the aim of Catholic missions in Russia and other CIS countries is the traditionally Orthodox population. These individuals were forcibly separated from their Orthodox roots during decades of an atheistic regime, yet not all can be categorised as unbelievers or atheists. Many find themselves at a crossroads, engaged in spiritual searching; however, as practice shows, the majority return to the faith of their ancestors, discovering their spiritual path in Orthodoxy.” It is impossible to deny the profound spiritual, cultural, and historical bond between our nation and Orthodoxy. What is perplexing, however, is that Catholics, who belong to a Church where the concept of tradition is one of the fundamental principles, challenge thetraditional character of Orthodoxy in Russia through their actions. For many, Russia is viewed as a missionary field for the “evangelisation” of the local population. In essence, the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church towards Russia is not dissimilar to that of various sectarians who seek to “Christianise”
the post-Soviet space, aiming to create a kind of “religious market” in which religious organisations compete for “consumers.” The underlying logic is clear: the entity that is larger, more powerful, and first occupies a given “market sector” is deemed to be correct.
An example of such activity is Bishop Jerzy Mazur. He is described as follows: “He was born in Poland in 1953 and joined the Verbist novitiate in 1972, where he also completed his seminary studies. From 1980 to 1982, the future bishop studied missiology at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. On May 18,1999, he was appointed Apostolic Administrator of Eastern Siberia. By papal decree on November 10, 2000, he was also appointed Apostolic Administrator of the Prefecture of Karafuto—the name for Sakhalin Island during the Japanese occupation This represents a blatant disregard for the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. Due to Bishop Jerzy Mazur’s missionary training and
attitude, the clergy under his jurisdiction engage in extensive missionaryactivities in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Reports of Catholic proselytism continually emerge from these regions. In particular, in 2000, the Orthodox faithful in Kamchatka were outraged by provocative statements made by
Catholic priest Jarosław Wiszniewski, one of Bishop Jerzy Mazur’s collaborators, on local television, wherein he questioned the Orthodox Church, stating, among other things, that ‘it is unclear in which faith Rus’ was baptised
—Orthodoxy or Catholicism.’ A subsequent case of open proselytism in Kamchatka is also associated with this Catholic priest. In March 2000, residents of a district in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky sent a letter to Bishop Ignacy of Petropavlovsk and Kamchatka. The letter stated that two women, acting on
behalf of the Catholic Church and Father Jarosław Wiszniewski, visited people’s homes, offering them free Catholic literature and placing handwritten Catholic prayers, including the Prayer of St. Francis, in their mailboxes.”
On July 10, 2002, Metropolitan Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz published an open letter
to Metropolitan Cyril, politely rejecting the aforementioned accusations.
The Russian Canonical Territory
As we can see, a disinformation campaign began in Russia aimed at inciting fear about Polish Catholic priests, who were allegedly ignoring the existence of the so-called Russian canonical territory—an area where Orthodoxy is intended to dominate, and missionary activity is forbidden. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the Church significantly weakened. The number of believers who regularly
participate in religious services remains relatively low, with estimates suggesting that only about 15-20% of Russia’s 140 million citizens consider themselves Orthodox. Polish clergy were perceived as one of the most significant obstacles to the development of dialogue between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Russian accusations against Poland regarding proselytism have their roots in the
complex political and religious history between the two countries. Proselytism —actively converting individuals to one’s religion—is often viewed by authoritarian governments as a form of cultural threat or external politicalinfluence.
Historical Background
Relations between Poland and Russia, both politically and religiously, have been tense for centuries. As a Catholic state, Poland has a long history of influence in a region that now includes Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania—areas with an Orthodox religious heritage that were, at various times, under both Polish and Russian rule. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which united with Poland through the Union of Lublin (1569), was originally a predominantly Orthodox territory, but after the Union of Brest in 1596, some Orthodox believers converted to Catholicism in the form of Greek Catholicism. During the First Polish Republic, Poland actively promoted Catholicism in these lands, fuelling Russian resentment, as Russia saw itself as the protector of Orthodoxy and the advocate
for the unity of Eastern Christianity.
The Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church
The Russian Orthodox Church plays a key role in Russian national identity and is closely linked to state power. In this context, any actions perceived as Catholic proselytism are treated as a threat to Russia’s religious and cultural unity. For years, Russian authorities have accused various religious institutions, including the Catholic Church, of attempting to convert Orthodox believers, particularly in disputed regions such as Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Poland as a Catholic Centre in Central and Eastern Europe Poland, with its strong Catholic roots, is often viewed by Russia as a cultural
and religious adversary, especially in the context of competition for influence in Eastern Europe. Poland’s support for Catholicism, religious freedom, and democratic values in the region is perceived by the Russian authorities as a form of interference in Russia’s internal affairs and those of its neighbours. In the geopolitical context, Russia’s accusations against Poland are part of a broader
narrative about the threat posed by the West. Russia employs rhetoric about defending itself against foreign influence to strengthen its internal position and legitimise its aggressive foreign policy. Accusing Poland of proselytism may also be an attempt to undermine the moral legitimacy of Poland’s support for Ukraine’s struggle for independence. Although the Catholic Church in Poland
has strong ties to the state and society, it does not actively engage in proselytising activities in Russia or in countries with an Orthodox majority.
Today’s Russian allegations of Polish proselytism are more political in nature than genuine accusations of religious conversion efforts. These allegations primarily serve as a tool to create a negative image of Poland in Russian media and foreign policy, as well as for internal Russian propaganda. The aim is to reinforce the association: Catholic equals Pole, Orthodox equals Russian. Conclusion
Russian accusations against Poland regarding proselytism stem from historicalreligious and political tensions, as well as the current geopolitical situation. Although Poland historically had significant religious influence in the East, today’s allegations are largely part of a propaganda narrative that seeks to portray Poland as a threat to Russian cultural and religious identity. These efforts will likely intensify as Russia’s internal situation becomes more complex.
The Russian Orthodox Church, closely tied to the Russian state, does not fear Catholic proselytism in the sense of direct conversion efforts. Rather, it fears the growing presence of Catholics and the activities of the Catholic Church in post- Soviet territories. The expansion of the Catholic Church is perceived by Russian authorities and Orthodox bishops as a threat to the dominant position of Orthodoxy in Russia, and therefore to Putin’s regime. Even though the Catholic Church does not pose a serious numerical threat, it is regarded by Russia as acarrier of foreign, Western values.
Marek Melnyk
COMMENTS